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I. INTRODUCTION 
The discovery and widespread use of antibiotics stand as perhaps the 
most important medical advance of the twentieth century. These 'miracle' 
drugs, starting with penicillin, made many previously fatal bacterial infec-
tions curable with a few pills or injections. It was unsurprising that over the 
latter half of the century we continuously intensified our use of these potent, 
cost-effective substances. 
The Author thanks John Duffy, Rich Hynes, Fred McChesney, Alan Meese, Warren Schwartz, and 
workshop participants at Georgetown and William & Mary law schools. This research was funded in 
part by a grant from the Barber Fund for Interdisciplinary Legal Research. 
611 
HeinOnline -- 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 612 2004-2005
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 
An inevitable (with the benefit of hindsight) result of unleashing this 
powerful attack on our bacterial foes did come as a surprise: bacteria 
evolved defenses to antibiotics, often with astonishing speed. Doctors con-
tinue to detect these resistant strains of bacteria (resistant to one or more an-
tibiotics) in greater and greater numbers. In 2000, the World Health 
Organization warned that "the world could be plunged back into the 'prean-
tibiotic era' when people commonly died from diseases that in modem 
times have been easily treated with antibiotics .... " 1 In Britain, the gov-
ernment estimates that over 5000 hospital patients a year die from bacterial 
infections resistant to antibiotics.2 
The trend may have intensified recently. In the fall of 2003, four 
members of the University of Southern California's national championship 
football team were hospitalized for bacterial infections resistant to com-
monly used antibiotics. 3 Researchers at Children's Hospital in Pittsburgh 
reported an outbreak of resistant streptococcus ("strep") bacteria. The lead 
author of the study stated that "[w]e've talked about this for years and now 
it's here."4 Over a thousand prison inmates in Los Angeles County con-
tracted "painful and aggressive skin infections caused by a bacterium resis-
tant to many antibiotics .... "5 Doctors found this outbreak particularly 
worrisome because the bacteria spread to patients without skin wounds or 
other weaknesses ordinarily necessary to make people susceptible to infec-
tion. Although there were no fatalities, "in some cases doctors ... had to 
cut away diseased tissue and administer weeks of intravenous antibiotics."6 
Initial reports in March 2003 indicated that the germ has spread outside the 
prison population and across the nation to Boston.7 A recent study found 
that ciprofloxacin ("cipro"), the antibiotic popularized as the agent of 
choice against anthrax infections, has become increasingly ineffective 
against many germs over the last few years. 8 In short, we now face the so-
bering possibility of serious, even lethal, bacterial infections that are on-
treatable. 
Despite increasing news coverage, the threat posed by resistant bacte-
ria does not seem to have made it onto the body politic's radar screen. 
There is little if any concerted public pressure on leaders to take decisive 
measures .to manage more judiciously our precious stocks of antibiotics. 
1 Marc Kaufman, Microbes Winning War, WASH. POST, June 13,2000, at AI. 
2 Linda Brown, Hospital Infections: Case Studies, BBC NEWS, Feb. I 7, 2000, at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/health/646369.stm. 
Bl. 
3 Charles Ornstein & Gary Klein, Outbreak of Staph Hits USC Team, L.A. TIMES, Sept. I 3, 2003, at 
4 Laurie Tarkan, Outbreak of Drug-Resistant Strep Bacteria, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2002, at A23 . 
5 David Tuller, Mystery Surrounds a Virulent Skin Infection, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2003, at 06. 
6 /d. 
7 Stephen Smith, Resistant-Bacteria Reports Cause Alarm, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 2, 2003, at B I. 
8 Melinda M. Neuhauser et al., Antibiotic Resistance Among Gram-Negative Bacilli in US Intensive 
Care Units, Implications for Fluoroquinolone Use, 289 JAMA 885 (2003). 
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Inaction is all the more unfortunate because overuse of antibiotics is a clas-
sic collective action problem-precisely the sort of problem where govern-
ment action and only government action can provide a solution. The 
purpose of this Article is to outline efficient, effective measures to econo-
mize on antibiotic use, so that we have effective drugs for serious cases 
long into the future, and to combat any future bacterial plague that may oc-
cur. 
Part II gives a brief history of antibiotics and the bacterial evolution of 
resistance to them. Part III explains aspects of the biology of resistance 
relevant to policy choices. Two lessons stand out from these sections. 
First, bacteria acquire resistance much more easily than one might think: 
they routinely share genes encoding resistance with a wide variety of other 
bacteria, including very dissimilar species. Second, recent research sug-
gests that once bacteria develop resistance to an antibiotic, they are unlikely 
to lose resistance even if the particular antibiotic disappears from their envi-
ronment. Thus, there appears to be little hope of 'reviving' the effective-
ness of antibiotics by withdrawing them from use for some 'rest' period. 
This last point serves as a launching point for Part IV, which draws on 
economics to formulate optimal policies for limiting antibiotic use. As a re-
source unable to regenerate itself, antibiotics are analogous to minerals in 
the ground, as opposed to fish in the sea: they are an exhaustible (or de-
pletable) resource. Although we can continue to manufacture them indefi-
nitely, the number of effective doses of each antibiotic is limited by the 
ability of bacteria to develop resistance. As such, they require special eco-
nomic analysis. Within the framework of exhaustible resource economics, 
there is a fundamental difficulty with antibiotics: current /ow-value uses 
(e.g., treatment of minor infections that may not even be bacterial) will de-
prive us of future high-value uses (e.g., treatment of life-threatening bacte-
rial infections). This happens because there is no way for future potential 
users to pay present low-value users to forego consumption. As such, anti-
biotic consumption has a negative external effect on future consumption. 
The fundamental motivation driving the policy discussion in this Article is 
to identify measures that will discourage current low-value use, to preserve 
effective doses of the antibiotic for future high-value uses. 
Previous work has either focused on this negative externality without 
drawing on exhaustible resource economics, or has used such economics 
but assumed that all infections are equally harmful, making it impossible to 
analyze what this Article takes as the fundamental question-trading off 
current low-value uses for future high-value uses. In addition, this Article 
studies at length the policy implications of' measures not previously exam-
ined. Part IV.C.3 shows that there is a strong case for the government to 
subsidize tests that can identify both the germ responsible for an infection 
and the drugs to which the germ has resistance. 
Part IV.D then introduces patents (in economic terms, time-limited 
monopolies) into the analysis and studies their effect on antibiotic policy, 
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stressing that patents serve a property-right creation function in this con-
text, independent of their usual innovation-inducing role. This section 
makes a novel and radical argument that patent terms for antibiotics should 
be extremely long. Trying to encourage pharmaceutical companies to 
stockpile drugs to deal with potential plagues, the subject of Part IV.E, but-
tresses the case for very long-term patents. 
Finally, Part V addresses jurisdictional questions raised by state bor-
ders in America (Part V.A) and distributional issues raised by the necessity 
of worldwide efforts to curb overuse of antibiotics. Given the extent of in-
ternational travel and trade, overuse of antibiotics in any nation likely will 
spread resistant bacteria around the globe. Any policy, then, is only as 
good as its "weakest link." Under such conditions, it is in the self interest 
of wealthy nations to subsidize the efforts of poorer nations. 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF ANTIBIOTICS AND BACTERIAL RESISTANCE 
Predating our scientific age, some cultures seem to have stumbled 
across effective naturally occurring antibacterial agents. At least one study 
indicates that members of an ancient culture ingested therapeutic doses of 
tetracycline, an antibiotic 'rediscovered' in the twentieth century.9 Other 
folk remedies, such as ingesting moldy bread, may have delivered effective 
doses of antibiotics. 10 
Although there were a number of earlier scientific observations and 
findings, the antibiotic age began in earnest when Alexander Fleming no-
ticed that a mold contaminating one of his bacteria cultures had killed off 
all the germs in its neighborhood. 11 Later research revealed that the mold 
produced a chemical, penicillin, that could cure bacterial infections in hu-
mans.12 Since this discovery, scientists have identified, and pharmaceutical 
companies have produced, numerous different antibacterial compounds that 
are effective against human (and animal) infections. 13 
These antibiotics have had a dramatic positive impact on human health. 
Formerly untreatable bacterial infections, some lethal or seriously disabling, 
have ceased to pose any threat. In conjunction with improved public health 
(e.g., water supplies free of cholera and other microbes), antibiotics in-
9 Everett J. Basset et at. , Tetracycline-Labeled Bone from Ancient Sudanese Nubia, 209 SCIENCE 
1532 (1980). 
10 MADELINE DREXLER, SECRET AGENTS: THE MENACE OF EMERGING INFECTIONS 121 (2002), 
available at http://www.nap.edu/books/0309076382/html (last visited Feb. 19, 2004). 11 David Ho, Scientists & Thinkers: Alexander Fleming, TIME, Mar. 29, 1999, available at 
http://www .time.com/time/time I 00/scientist/profile/fleming.html. 
12 !d. 
13 MICHAEL T . MADIGAN ET Al., BROCK BIOLOGY OF MICROORGANISMS 426, 440, 442 (8th ed. 
1997). 
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creased the median life span by eight years, from sixty-two to seventy, dur-
ing their first twenty years ofuse (1935 to 1955).14 
Yet almost from the beginning of their widespread use, doctors noticed 
that bacteria developed countermeasures to antibiotics. Researchers re-
ported significant levels of penicillin resistance in "staph." infections (short 
for Staphylococcus aureus, a common species of bacteria that normally 
does not cause serious infections, but can if it enters the bloodstream or vi-
tal organs) as early as 1945. 15 Over ninety-five percent of staph. bacteria 
today are resistant to penicillin and related compounds. 16 
Multiple resistant Staphylococcus aureus ("MRSA") strains have suc-
cessively evolved resistance to almost every class of antibiotics, including: 
synthetic variants of penicillin such as methicillin, cephalosporins, pen ems, 
and carbapenems. There was great hope in the 1980s that tluoroquinolones, 
such as cipro, would remain effective because they use a novel mechanism 
of manufactured origin to attack bacteria. This unnatural, or "synthetic" 
characteristic, however, made little difference. "A study by the Centers for 
Disease Control showed that ciprotloxacin resistance of MRSA went from 
less than 5% to greater than 80% within one year .... " 17 
Today, some strains of MRSA are resistant to all mainstream antibiot-
ics except vancomycin, which has become a critical antibiotic of "last re-
sort."18 Even more ominously, there have been sporadic appearances of 
staph. infections exhibiting moderate resistance to vancomycin (labeled 
VISA-vancomycin intermediate Staphylococcus aureus). 19 Summing up 
staph.'s repeated ability to defeat almost all antibiotics deployed against it, 
one scientist said that these episodes "illustrate the rapid ability of bacteria 
to become resistant to virtually all antibacterial agents whether of natural 
origin . . . partially synthetic . . . or totally synthetic, such as tluoroqui-
nolones."20 
14 David Schlessinger, Biological Basis for Antibacterial Action, in MECHANISMS OF MICROBIAL 
DISEASE 78 (Moselio Schaechter et al. eds ., 1993). 15 Wesley Spink & Viola Ferris, Quantitative Action of Penicillin Inhibitor from Penicillin-
Resistant Strains of Staphylococci, I 02 SCIENCE 221 (1945). 16 Harold C. Neu, The Crisis in Antibiotic Resistance, 257 SCIENCE 1064 (1992) (citing Bruce Lyon 
& Ronald A. Skurray, Antimicrobial Resistance of Staphylococcus aureus: Genetic Basics, 51 
MICROBIOLOGY REV. 88 (1987)). 17 /d. (citing Henry A. Blumberg et a!., Rapid Development of Ciprojloxacin Resistance in Methicil-
lin-Susceptible and -Resistant Staphylococcus aureus, 163 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1279 (1991 )). 18 OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, OTA-H-629, IMPACT OF ANTIBIOTIC-RESISTANT 
BACTERIA 72 (U .S. Gov't Printing Off. 1995), available at http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ 
-ota!diskl/1995/9503_n.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2004) [hereinafter OTA). 
19 Ctrs. for Disease Control, VISAIVRSA Vancomycin-Intermediate/Resistant Staphylococcus aureus 
Fact Sheet (Apr. I, 2003) (documenting cases of VISA in eight states), at http://www.cdc.gov/nci-
dodlhip/aresist/visa.htm. 20 Neu, supra note 16, at I 065. 
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Some strains of another family of bacteria, enterococci, have devel-
oped complete resistance to vancomycin along with all other mainstream 
antibiotics. 21 The mechanism developed by the bacteria 
completely changes the ingredients it uses to make its cell wall, ingredients 
that are normally targeted by vancomycin . . . . "That's a real tour de force," 
says David Hooper, an infection control director at Massachusetts General 
Hospital. "What they tell me is: No matter what we come up with, over time 
bugs are going to figure out a way to get around it.'m 
Fortunately, enteroccoci cause many fewer serious infections than 
staph. As discussed in the next section, however, unrelated bacteria fre-
quently share genes encoding resistance to antibiotics. MRSA acquiring 
complete resistance to vancomycin would constitute "an unstoppable kil-
ler ... the latest twist in an international public health nightmare: increas-
ing bacterial resistance to many antibiotics ... :m 
There is nothing particularly special about staph. or enterococcus; vir-
tually all infectious bacteria have developed resistance to some antibiotics. 
Strep. bacteria responsible for many throat infections developed significant 
resistance to the antibiotic erythromycin in only two years.24 Moraxella, a 
source of middle ear and chest infections, was virtually I 00% vulnerable to 
ampicillin in the 1970s; within twenty years, over 75% of such infections 
were fully resistant to it, and to chemically similar antibiotics. 25 
The threat posed by antibiotic-resistant bacteria is greater because of a 
sort of whipsaw effect in the pharmaceutical industry. By the early 1980s, 
there were over I 00 antibiotics and resistance was not yet a serious prob-
lem. Thus, drug makers invested relatively little effort in developing new 
antibacterial agents. When MRSA and other resistant strains began to pose 
a serious public health problem in the 1990s, there were no new drugs to 
deploy. Perhaps worse, given the long period required to develop new 
drugs, there were few drugs in the pipeline. Although pharmaceutical com-
panies seem to be gearing up their antibiotic R&D efforts, society will not 
reap the benefits from these efforts for years. 26 Over the short term, before 
researchers develop new antibiotics, untreatable bacterial infections are a 
real possibility. 
The speed with which bacteria build up resistance suggests a need for a 
steady stream of new treatments. Recall that MRSA became largely resis-
tant to cipro after only three years. Early experience with linezolid, a novel 
21 OTA,supranote 18,at72. 
22 !d. at 146. 
23 Stuart B. Levy, The Challenge of Antibiotic Resistance, 278 Sci. AM. 46, 46 (1998). 
24 Neu, supra note 16. 
25 Richard J. Wallace Jr. et al., BRO ft-Lactamases of Branhamella catarrhalis and Moraxel/a Sub-
genus Moraxe/!a, 33 ANTIMICROBIAL AGENTS & CHEMOTHERAPY 1845 (1989). 
26 OT A, supra note 18, at 28. 
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type of antibiotic approved in 2000, is no more promising: doctors detected 
strains of staph. resistant to this new drug in 200 I. 27 
The threat posed by antibiotic-resistant bacteria has caught the atten-
tion of the medical establishment. The Centers for Disease Control 
launched a "Prevent Antimicrobial Resistance Campaign" in 200 128 ; the 
World Health Organization has a similar program.29 Before discussing the 
efficacy of these and other policies designed to deal with the threat of resis-
tant microbes,30 the next section lays out some basic biological facts about 
bacteria and resistance that are important in assessing policy responses. 
III. THE BIOLOGY OF ANTIBIOTICS AND RESISTANCE 
There seems little doubt that heavy use of antibiotics has driven the 
rapid spread of resistant strains. Bacterial foes such as molds and fungi 
have fought such biochemical wars with bacteria for ages, but apparently 
never with the intensity that humans have employed antibiotics over the last 
sixty-odd years. Tests on bacteria preserved from before the age of antibi-
otics show that bacteria had evolved some resistance to naturally occurring 
antibiotics, but most remained vulnerable to the vast majority of the antibi-
otics developed since Fleming's discovery of penicillin. 31 
Heavy use does not necessarily mean overuse; e.g., if every dose of 
every antibiotic administered saved a life, it would be difficult to argue that 
we are wasting this valuable resource. Use, however, has not been so lim-
ited. Doctors routinely prescribe antibacterial drugs to treat infections that 
are likely viral-in which case (i) the treatment has absolutely no therapeu-
tic benefit for the patient, and (ii) the use of the antibiotic still fosters the 
spread of resistance in other bacteria present in the patient. Some estimate 
that half of all antibiotic prescriptions are written for patients who will ex-
perience no benefit from the medication. 32 
In fairness to doctors and patients, it is often expensive and time-
consuming to determine if an infection is viral or bacterial.33 If, however, 
the infection is not serious, then there is a good argument that antibiotics 
simply should not be used. If the infection is viral, the drugs are worthless 
27 DREXLER, supra note I 0, at 120. 
28 Ctrs. for Disease Control, Campaign to Prevent Antimicrobial Resistance in Healthcare Settings, 
at http://www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/healthcare/default.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2004). 
29 World Health Org., Communicable Disease Surveillance & Response, at http://www.who.int/ 
csr/drugresist/en (last visited Feb. 19, 2004). 
30 See infra Part IV. 
31 Victoria M. Hughes & Naomi Datta, Conjugative Plasmids in Bacteria of the 'Pre-Antibiotic· 
Era, 302 NATURE 725 (1983). 
32 OTA, supra note 18, at 73-74. 
33 /d. at 127-29, 134; see infra Part IV.C.3. 
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to the patient; even if the infection is bacterial, frequently antibiotics do not 
even shorten the duration of the illness. 34 
Although these may be the largest categories of overuse, there are 
other significant prodigal misuses of antibiotics. Many surgeons use them 
far earlier than necessary as prophylactic measures to prevent infection after 
surgery.35 In a slightly different vein, doctors often prescribe "wide-
spectrum" antibiotics-those that are active against many types of bacte-
ria-when a narrower-spectrum drug would suffice. This, of course, accel-
erates the spread of resistance to those antibiotics that are useful in the 
greatest variety of cases, in effect wasting the effectiveness of a more valu-
able drug. 
The livestock industry may be frittering away the usefulness of antibi-
otics by using large quantities of the drugs, at low doses, as growth enhan-
cers; up to seventy percent of the antibiotics used in the United States each 
year may be for this purpose. 36 This steady exposure to low doses creates 
an ideal environment for the evolution of resistant bacteria. The low doses 
mean that strains with only an initial, modest resistance can survive expo-
sure to the drug, and continual exposure places pressure on all bacteria pre-
sent to evolve greater resistance. 
Although there is no positive proof that resistant strains that evolved in 
animals have jumped the species barrier to humans, scientists have recently 
come very close to demonstrating such a link. 37 Moreover, there appears to 
be a widespread belief that such a path of transmission exists. Based on the 
fear of this link, Sweden has banned the large-scale use of antibiotics for 
animal growth enhancement. Denmark banned the use of avoparcin, a close 
relative of the important "last resort" antibiotic vancomycin, after studies 
showed its use increased the presence of vancomycin-resistant enterococci 
(VRE) in Europe. Similar legislation has been introduced to the U.S. Con-
gress,38 and the World Health Organization now urges a complete halt to the 
systematic use of antibiotics in animal feed. 39 
Long-term use of antibiotics in all of these inappropriate ways placed 
extraordinary pressure on bacteria to change (or die). The first, necessary 
step in the appearance of resistance to a new antibiotic is simple random 
34 Jerome 0 . Klein, Otitis externa, Otitis media, Mastoiditis, in GERALD L. MANDELL ET AL. , 
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES 579, 579-85 (4th ed. 1994). 35 Richard P. Wenzel, Preoperative Antibiotic Prophylaxis, 326 NEW ENG. J. MED. 337 (1992). 36 DREXLER, supra note 10, at 139. 
37 C. Moubareck et al., Multiple Antibiotic Resistance Gene Transfer from Animal to Human En-
terococci in the Digestive Tract of Gnotobiotic Mice, 47 ANTIMICROBIAL AGENTS & CHEMOTHERAPY 
2993 (2003). 38 Preservation of Antibiotics for Human Treatment Act of 2002, H.R. 3804, 107th Cong. (2002) 
(prohibiting the non-therapeutic use in animal feed of eight antimicrobial drugs that could affect resis-
tance to drugs used in human medicine), available at http://www.asm.org/Policylindex.asp?bid=3987. 39 David Ferber, Antibiotic Resistance: WHO Advises Kicking the Livestock Antibiotic Habit, 301 
SCIENCE 1027 (2003). 
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mutation. Just as humans evolved from apes based on a series of small, 
random "errors" in DNA replication that gave individuals more strength or 
cunning, any bacteria that mutates in a way that reduces the effectiveness of 
an antibiotic will have a competitive advantage in the presence of such (to 
the bacteria) poison. Bacteria, however, evolve much more rapidly. Hu-
mans have roughly five generations a century; bacteria can have over 
25,000 generations a year.40 Every instance of reproduction offers another 
opportunity for mutation. Moreover, bacterial genetic material is less stable 
than that of more complex organisms, further increasing the number of mu-
tations. The vast majority of these random alterations to its genetic material 
undoubtedly harm the bacteria, but a small percentage are useful-such as 
mutations that provide a defense against antibiotics. 
Unfortunately, mutations are not the end of the processes by which 
bacteria develop resistance to antibiotics. Bacteria are surprisingly sexual: 
they continually swap bits of genetic material ("plasmids"), and sometimes 
these strands of DNA contain codes for resistance. 
The bacterium itself is the focus, if the resistance trait is linked solely to that 
bacterium and cannot be shared by others. This is, however, not the case with 
most resistant traits in the majority of bacteria. They have evolved extrachro-
mosomal replicating genes called plasmids and their associated transposons 
which allow rapid and very broad dissemination of genes .... Gene transfer 
crosses species and genus barriers. The genetic flexibility and versatility of 
bacteria have therefore contributed largely to the efficiency by which antibiotic 
resistance has spread among bacteria and among environments globally.41 
Note well Professor Levy's statement that these strands of DNA can 
"cross[] species and genus barriers." Absent such transfers, every individ-
ual species of bacteria would have to hit on a lucky mutation to gain resis-
tance. With such transfers, it takes only one mutation in one species to 
spread resistance across a broad swath of bacteria. Worse, plasmids fre-
quently contain the code for resistance to multiple antibiotics; thus, a single 
exchange can confer resistance to more than one drug.42 
The ability of bacteria to pass around genes raises a new dimension to 
the problem of growing resistance to antibiotics. As discussed in Part III, 
most models assume that resistance increases with doses used and only with 
doses used. The idea is that resistant mutations confer an evolutionary ad-
vantage only in the presence of the antibiotic. Bacteria, however, may pass 
around plasmids conferring resistance in the absence of an antibiotic. Thus, 
bacterial exchange of plasmids means that resistance can spread with the 
pure passage of time, even if no additional doses are being used. As dis-
40 OT A, supra note 18, at 41. 
41 Stuart B. Levy, Antibiotic Resistance: An Ecological Imbalance, in ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE: 
0RJGIN, EVOLUTION, SELECTION AND SPREAD 5 (1997) (citation omitted). 
42 Seth P. Cohen et al., A Multidrug Resistance Regulatory Chromosomal Locus Is Widespread 
Among Enteric Bacteria, 168 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 484 ( 1993); see also OTA, supra note 18, at 43. 
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cussed in Part IV.B.3, this possibility can significantly alter the optimal pol-
icy for employing antibiotics. 
There is some evidence that the effect of doses prescribed, especially 
doses recently prescribed, dominates any such time effect. A number of 
studies (discussed immediately below) have shown that when a hospital or a 
nation ceases use of a particular antibiotic, the percentage of bacteria resis-
tant to that antibiotic declines. These observations raise the possibility of 
restoring the potency of antibiotics by suspending their use for a sufficient 
interval. In theory, with enough antibiotics, then, we could simply 'cycle' 
between them. When resistance reaches some critical level, we would 
"rest" that drug until bacteria lost their resistance to it. If letting antibiotics 
"lie fallow" periodically did restore their potency, following such a policy 
would significantly diminish, and perhaps entirely solve, the problem of re-
sistant bacterial infections. Unfortunately, as the following argument dem-
onstrates, withdrawing antibiotics from use is unlikely to restore their 
effectiveness against resistant strains of bacteria. 
The biological theory behind such a loss of resistance is that, like any 
other biological function, resistance imposes a cost on bacteria. Microbes 
expending energy and genetic storage space on resistance have less re-
sources to thrive and replicate. In the presence of the antibiotic, the benefits 
of resistance exceed these costs and thus resistant strains have an advantage. 
Withdraw the drug and the "fitness cost" of resistance (i.e., the disadvantage 
a bacteria experiences when it shifts resources to fighting antibiotics, neces-
sarily depriving other functions of resources) has no offsetting benefit. The 
hope is that non-resistant strains will then outgrow and displace their resis-
tant cousins. 
Five years ago, Stuart Levy, a leading scholar on antibiotic resistant, 
expressed optimism about this possibility: "[T]he evidence suggests that, 
given a 'ready and willing' susceptible flora [i.e., non-resistant strains of 
bacteria], a resistance predominance can be overturned if antibiotics are re-
moved."43 The basis for his optimism, apparently, was a series of studies 
showing reduced presence of resistant bacteria on cessation of use of a 
given drug. Here are some examples: 
• when Czechoslovakia's hospitals cut antibiotic use from 20% to 
as much as 50%, the percent of staph. infections exhibiting resis-
tance fell significantly;44 
• when Mt. Sinai Hospital imposed strict controls on the use of 
some antibiotics, mortality from infectious diseases fell; 45 
43 Levy, supra note 41 , at 6. 
44 Zdenek Modr, Statutory Control of Antibiotic Use in Man Versus Voluntary Restriction, in THE 
CONTROL OF ANTIBIOTIC-RESISTANT BACTERIA 211, 214-19 (Charles H. Stuart-Harris & David M. 
Harris eds., 1982). 
45 Salom Z. Hirschman et a!., Use of Antimicrobial Agents in a University Teaching Hospital, 148 
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• when the University of Massachusetts Hospital imposed strict 
regulations on the use of vancomycin, they eliminated vancomy-
cin-resistant enterococci (VRE infections) for an extended pe-
riod.46 
Not all such studies, however, have offered grounds for optimism: 
• when doctors decreased antibiotic use by over 30% in a number of 
Alaskan villages, "[n]o sustained decrease in carriage of penicil-
lin-nonsusceptible strains was observed;"47 
• when a hospital decreased antibiotic use on patients using ventila-
tors (which can spread pneumonia easily), the percentage of the 
staph. population exhibiting resistance fell only from 60% to 
40%;48 
• similarly, when doctors in Taiwan completely stopped prescribing 
penicillin for gonorrhea, resistance did drop somewhat but lev-
eled off at 60% of isolates.49 
Moreover, none of these studies, encouraging or discouraging, address 
the key question: even if the resistant population does decline after society 
shelves an antibiotic, if any resistant bacteria remain, how quickly will they 
reproduce and again become omnipresent? "[T]hough resistant strains can 
drop in number if they lose out in competition with drug[-]sensitive strains, 
they seldom disappear completely. That means there is always a residue of 
resistant bacteria around, ready to multiply if the right antibiotic rains down 
on them. "50 
Over five years ago, Richard Lenski argued that the same evolutionary 
forces that gave rise to resistance would also make that resistance persistent. 
"[E]volving populations of bacteria tend to compensate for the deleterious 
side-effects of their resistance genes .... "51 Lenski cited a study from 1977 
showing that although the first strains of gonorrhea resistant to penicillin 
ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 200 I, 2005 ( 1988) (noting further, however, that while the mortality rate 
fell, the drop was not statistically significant and could be attributable to other factors). 46 Paul P. Belliveau et al., Limiting Vancomycin Use to Combat Vancomycin-Resistant Enterococ-
cusfaceum, 53 AM. J. HEALTH-SYS. PHARMACY 1570 (1996). 47 Thomas W. Hennessy et al., Changes in Antibiotic-Prescribing Practices and Carriage of Peni-
cillin-Resistant Streptococcus pneumoniae: A Controlled Intervention Trial in Rural Alaska, 34 
CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1543 (2002). 48 Didier Gruson et al., Rotation and Restricted Use of Antibiotics in a Medica/Intensive Care Unit: 
Impact on the Incidence of Ventilator-Associated Pneumonia Caused by Antibiotic-Resistant Gram-
Negative Bacteria, 162 AM. J. RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED. 837 (2000). 49 Mong-Ling Chu et al., Epidemiology of Penicillin-Resistant Neisseria gonorrhoeae Isolated in 
Taiwan, /960-/990, 14 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 450 (1992). 
50 DREXLER, supra note I 0, at 150. 
51 Richard E. Lenski, The Cost of Antibiotic Resistance-from the Perspective of a Bacterium, in 
ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE: ORIGIN, EVOLUTION, SELECTION AND SPREAD, supra note 41, at 13 7. 
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were unstable, the plasmids encoding resistance became stable within a few 
months. 52 
Additional research over the last few years seems to strengthen Len-
ski's argument. There is a growing body of evidence demonstrating that 
(i) the fitness costs of resistance are often small, and (ii) further evolution 
quickly reduces or eliminates these costs. 
[C]hromosomal drug resistance mutations studied often had only a small fit-
ness cost; compensatory mutations were not involved in low-cost or no-cost 
resistance mutations. When drug resistance mutations found in clinical iso-
lates were considered, selection of those mutations that have little or no fitness 
cost in the in vitro competition assay seems to occur.53 
Another study similarly found that although the first mutations confer-
ring resistance are often unstable, subsequent mutations frequently stabilize 
the change. 54 And a more recent study identified a specific second-stage 
mutation that reduces or eliminates the fitness cost of resistance to penicil-
lin without reducing the resistant capability at all. The authors in this latest 
study speculated that "[t]his pattern of stability loss and restoration may be 
common in the evolution of new enzyme activity."55 Another study finding 
that "adaptation to the fitness costs of [resistance] occurs by mitigation of 
the deleterious effects of the resistance mutations (compensatory evolution) 
rather than through reversion to the drug-sensitive state," further found that 
there is "no obvious association between the magnitude of ... resistance 
and its allied cost. "56 In other words, there is no ground for hoping that the 
most radical mutations-the ones that confer the most novel and effective 
resistance to antibiotics-are less stable and thus less likely to persist. To 
sum up, "[t]he data available from recent laboratory studies suggest that 
most, but not all, resistance-determining mutations and accessory elements 
engender some fitness cost, but those costs are likely to be ameliorated by 
subsequent evolution. "57 
Lenski identified "repression" as one effective means by which a bac-
teria can minimize the fitness cost of resistance: the ability to turn off the 
resistance function when it is not necessary (i.e., when the antibiotic is not 
52 !d. at 138 (citing Marilyn C. Roberts et al., Molecular Characterization of Two -Lactamase-
SpecifYing P/asmids Isolated from Neisseria gonorrhoeae, 131 J. BACTERIOLOGY 557 ( 1977)). 
53 Peter Sander et al., Fitness Cost of Chromosomal Drug Resistance-Conferring Mutations, 46 
ANTIMICROBIAL AGENTS & CHEMOTHERAPY 1204, 1204 (2002). 
54 Ivan Nagaev et al., Biological Cost and Compensatory Evolution in Fusidic Acid-Resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus, 40 MOLECULAR MICROBIOLOGY 433 (2001). 
55 Xiaojun Wang et al., Evolution of an Antibiotic Resistance Enzyme Constrained by Stability and 
Activity Trade-ojft, 320 J. MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 85, 85 (2002). 
56 Mary G. Reynolds, Compensatory Evolution in Rifampin-Resistant Escherichia coli, 156 
GENETICS 1471, 1478 (2000). 
57 Dan I. Andersson & Bruce R. Levin, The Biological Cost of Antibiotic Resistance, 2 CURRENT 
OPINION MICROBIOLOGY 489,489 (1999). 
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present), combined with the ability to "switch on" resistance if and when 
the antibiotic re-enters the microbe's environment.58 Again, subsequent re-
search has bolstered this theory. A study of staph. resistance to the antibi-
otic gentamicin demonstrated that 
the emergence of [a resistant strain of staph. bacteria] following exposure to 
gentamicin results from a rapid switch and that bacteria exposed to cycles of 
[the antibiotic] gentamicin followed by antibiotic-free medium repeatedly 
switched between a resistant [strain] and a sensitive [i.e., non-resistant] paren-
tal phenotype (revertants). [This result] suggests that [staph.] has evolved an 
inducible and reversible resistance mechanism that circumvents a permanent 
cost to fitness. 59 
Even more troubling, when an antibiotic triggers such a switch, it may 
tum on repressed resistance to multiple antibiotics. "[A] single antibiotic to 
treat an infection can provoke resistance to other drugs .. . . One reason may 
be a master switch-dubbed MAR, for Multiple Antibiotic Resistance-on 
the cell's chromosome. 'It's almost as ifbacteria strategically anticipate the 
confrontation of other drugs when they resist one ... . "'60 
Another reason that resistance often persists even when the antibiotic is 
not present is that the plasmids that confer resistance on their host bacteria 
often provide other beneficial functionality. "Over time, plasmids and their 
bacterial hosts can enter a symbiotic relationship, in which the growth of 
the host depends on the plasmid-one reason that the drug resistance be-
stowed this way is hard to reverse."61 
These and related evolutionary mechanisms may well explain what is 
perhaps the most discouraging evidence that we cannot restore usefulness to 
antibiotics rendered impotent by past overuse: "the surprising persistence 
of resistance to tetracycline and streptomycin"-two antibiotics that have 
not been used heavily for decades.62 
Analyzing the fragrant contents of diapers from a daycare center, [Emory Pro-
fessor Bruce] Levin found that a quarter of the E. coli lurking between the 
folds resisted streptomycin, a drug rarely used in the last 30 years. Although 
in evolutionary theory resistant bacteria are presumed to be more genetically 
weighed down and therefore less fit to compete, Levin suspects that after E. 
coli gains drug resistance, it evolves a second compensatory mutation that 
keeps it from backsliding to a state of drug sensitivity.63 
58 Lenski, supra note 51, at 133. 
59 Ruth C. Massey et al., Phenotypic Switching of Antibiotic Resistance Circumvents Permanent 
Costs in Staphylococcus aureus, II CURRENT BIOLOGY 1810, 1810 (2001). 
60 DREXLER, supra note 10, at !50 (citation and quotation omitted). 
61 /d. at 149. 
62 Lenski, supra note 51 , at 138. 
63 DREXLER, supra note I 0, at 149-50. 
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Spanish doctors quit using tetracycline and chloramphenicol in the 
early 1980s, yet after fifteen years the percentage of resistant strep. pneu-
moniae bacteria fell only by half.64 Similarly, in East Germany, tetracy-
cline-resistant E. coli bacteria responsible for urinary tract infections fell 
only from 46% to 28% five years after termination of the use of tetracy-
cline. Lenski found no comfort in these numbers. 
While it may seem impressive that in five years the prevalence of resistance 
drops from 46% to 28%, if you put the bacteria back under positive antibiotic 
selection you have probably only bought yourself an extra week! It seems to 
be much easier to get resistant 'bugs' than to get rid ofthem.65 
Summing up, Lenski notes that none of these discouraging findings 
should be surprising. 
[A] reduction in the cost of antibiotic resistance is not some mysterious or un-
expected phenomenon. Instead, cost-reduction is a simple and general mani-
festation of the tendency for organisms to undergo genetic adaptation by 
natural selection. Just as organisms may adapt to overcome adverse aspects of 
their external environment (e.g. by becoming resistant to antibiotics), so too 
may they adapt to overcome adverse aspects of their internal physiology (e.g. 
by reducing harmful side-effects of resistance). Unfortunately, this trend im-
plies that it will become increasingly difficult over time to control the spread 
of resistant strains simply by suspending the usage of a particular antibiotic.66 
Others concur, finding that recent research "argue[s] against expecta-
tions that link decreased levels of antibiotic consumption with the decline in 
the level of resistance. "67 
In some sense, we missed our chance by not withdrawing antibiotics 
when resistance first appeared. "You would have to quit using penicillin 
when you saw the first resistant strain, because once it has spread too far 
you're never going to be able to return to complete susceptibility."68 Even 
such a stringent policy might not restore usefulness indefinitely; "if you can 
go 'cold turkey' right away, you may buy another ten years of susceptibil-
ity .... "69 We may have missed another chance presented by the plethora 
of novel antibiotics available in past decades, as it is more feasible to hold 
back new antibiotics when there are numerous alternatives. "We have had 
more classes of antimicrobial agents available to us in the 1980s than we 
are likely to have in the foreseeable future."70 Our overuse of antibiotics 
seems to have made the bacterial population irreversibly more threatening. 
64 Len ski, supra note 51, at 14 7 (comments of Baquero). 
65 !d. at 149 (comments of Lenski). 
66 !d. at 139. 
67 Sander et al., supra note 53, at 1204. 
68 Lenski, supra note 51, at 148 (comments ofLenski). 
69 !d. 
70 !d. at 150 (comments of Bennish). 
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"The real problem is that it may be too late to react, in the sense that our 
normal flora is now the normal resistant flora.'m 
In the end, we are fighting a battle against the most powerful force in 
biology: evolution. The development of resistance is not limited to mi-
crobes; Europeans developed enough of a resistance to smallpox that it did 
not pose a pandemic threat by the 1600s. Unfortunately, it posed a geno-
cidal threat to American Indians who had not.72 Australians employed the 
myxomatosis virus to decimate a rabbit population threatening to overrun 
the continent. Initially the virus killed 99% of the rabbit population, but the 
successors of the few survivors are now 50% resistant despite the introduc-
tion of successively more virulent strains of the virus.73 No matter how le-
thal a future bacterial plague might be, some humans likely would survive. 
By managing the use of existing, and especially of newly-developed antibi-
otics, we may have preserved enough of the effectiveness of antibiotics to 
reduce the mortality rate from any such plague far below the ninety-nine 
percent decimation suffered by Australia's rabbits. The remainder of this 
Article explores optimal use of antibiotics given the biological constraints 
discussed in this section. 
IV. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF RESISTANCE TO ANTIBIOTICS 
A plague is one of our greatest public health fears-an untreatable in-
fection caused by a lethal mutant bacterial strain that passes easily between 
persons (and perhaps other hosts). We already are experiencing isolated 
deaths due to untreatable bacterial infections. 74 More generally, resistance 
makes treating many infections more expensive. For example, curing a pa-
tient of penicillin-resistant gonorrhea costs twelve to fifteen times as much 
as treating non-resistant cases. 75 
Before commencing the economic analysis of antibiotic (over)use, it is 
worth discussing why this Article does not consider substances for treating 
other infections, e.g., viral or fungal. The reason for ignoring viruses is 
simple: there are basically no broadly effective antiviral medications. 
Without use, overuse cannot pose a problem. That said, if and when scien-
tists identify effective antiviral drugs, we will face the same issues that we 
face today vis-a-vis bacteria. Viruses mutate frequently and reproduce rap-
71 Levy, supra note 41, at II (comments of Baquero) (emphasis added). 
72 See P. M. ASHBURN, THE RANKS OF DEATH: A MEDICAL HISTORY OF THE CONQUEST OF 
AMERICA (Frank D. Ashburn ed., 1947); JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL: THE FATES OF 
HUMAN SOCIETIES 195-214 (1997); Dean R. Snow & Kim Lanphear, European Contact and Indian 
Depopulation in the Northeast: The Timing of the First Epidemics, 35 ETHNOHIST. 15, 17-24 (1988). 
73 Shelly Parer, Economic & Ecological Impact of Rabbits: Myxomatosis (1995) (unpublished stu-
dent paper, Australian Nat'l Univ.), at http://rubens.anu.edu.au/student.projects/rabbits/myxo.html (last 
visited Feb. 19, 2004). 
74 See Brown, supra note 2. 
75 OT A, supra note 18, at 60. 
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idly, and so are likely to develop resistance to such medications. 76 Drugs to 
treat other sorts of infections have induced resistant mutations; one example 
is the malaria protozoa. Unlike bacteria, however, anti-malarials are not 
used to treat a range of conditions, both low-value and high. Malaria is al-
ways a serious disease, and thus it is less clear that we gain anything by 
adopting policies to limit current use. It might be, however, that too many 
people travel to malarial zones, and that we need policies to discourage 
those 'marginal' travelers who would not be willing to pay a price for anti-
malarial medication that reflected the extent to which current use erodes fu-
ture efficacy of the drug. 
A. The Fundamental Problem 
As intimated in the previous paragraph, what makes antibiotics unusual 
is that their very use undermines their future usefulness, as bacteria evolve 
resistance. Clem Tisdell was first to point out this problem, in an article in-
explicably ignored by subsequent scholarship. 77 Unless there is some 
mechanism to force consumers to bear this cost when they buy antibiotics, 
they will ignore it and the populace will overuse antibiotics relative to the 
socially optimal level. To put this in stark terms, cheap and easy access to 
antibiotics today means that people will use them for very minor infections, 
and even for conditions that are likely caused by a virus or other microbe. 
Bacteria will develop resistance, and the drug will then be unavailable to 
treat life-threatening and seriously debilitating infections in the (possibly 
near-term) future. 
A simple example helps illustrate this problem. A patient goes to the 
doctor with ear pain. Based on an initial examination, the doctor concludes 
that the patient has an infection, and that there is a 75% chance that it is vi-
ral, and only a 25% chance that it is bacterial. In either case, the infection is 
not serious; the patient is likely to experience two to three days of moderate 
discomfort and then recover. A culture test, to determine whether the infec-
tion is bacterial or viral, takes a couple days and costs more than an antibi-
otic prescription. Weighing the modest cost of the drugs against a couple 
days of discomfort, the patient is willing to pay for the antibiotics even 
though she realizes that there is only a twenty-five percent chance that they 
will provide any relief. Under these facts, the patient will press her doctor 
for the prescription and likely obtain it: making patients happy is good for 
business, and the specter of a malpractice suit if the infection turns out to be 
bacterial and serious provides further impetus to write the prescription.78 
76 LESLIE COLLIER & JOHN OXFORD, HUMAN VIROLOGY 85 (2d ed. 2000). 
77 Clem Tisdell, Exploitation of Techniques that Decline in Effectiveness with Use, 37 FINANCES 
PUBLIQUE 428 ( 1982). 
78 Many claims arise from cases involving infections. OTA, supra note 18, at 75 (citing ST. PAUL 
FIRE & MARINE INS. Co., 1994 ANNUAL REPORT TO SHAREHOLDERS 4-5 (1995)); see also Nelson v. 
Hammon, 802 P.2d 452, 457 (Colo. 1990) (holding that given American Heart Association guidelines 
626 
HeinOnline -- 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 627 2004-2005
99:611 (2005) Preserving a Precious Resource 
The long-term cost of such episodes (multiplied by millions of doctor visits 
a year) is lost lives in the future due to untreatable bacterial infections. Be-
nign bacteria present in the patient's body, exposed to the antibiotic, will 
tend to evolve resistance. As discussed in the previous section, these bacte-
ria may then pass on resistance to other bacteria, or may migrate to parts of 
the body in which their presence is infectious rather than benign. The pa-
tient is not assessed for this cost, however, and so makes a decision that, 
while personally rational, is socially undesirable. 
There are many equivalent ways to characterize the problem. Perhaps 
most intuitively, the very use of antibiotics imposes an external cost on later 
potential consumers. There is no easy way to establish a market to mediate 
these conflicting uses. First and foremost, there is no way to identify the set 
of future potential consumers-basically a random collection of individuals 
who will contract serious bacterial infections years in the future. Even if we 
could identify these future buyers, it is difficult to imagine how they could 
pay present low-value users to refrain from using antibiotics. They cer-
tainly could not proceed individually; some sort of group action would be 
necessary on both sides. 
Remedying this externality is even more difficult when future genera-
tions will bear the cost of their predecessors' overuse of antibiotics. If bac-
teria develop resistance within the expected lives of most citizens living 
today, each citizen has a personal incentive to support policies eliminating 
the externality. If the process takes more than a generation, however, their 
incentives are second-order-the welfare of their children. Will the living 
give sufficient weight to the welfare of their progeny? The base problem is 
that there is no way for future generations to pay their predecessors to 
economize on antibiotic use. 79 
As Tisdell notes, current buyers are unlikely to refrain from use out of 
the goodness of their hearts. "[E]ven if users are aware of the unfavorable 
externality, actirig individually they are unlikely to restrict the use of the 
technique for the collective good .... [It] is akin to the prisoners' dilemma 
problem."80 This is another way to view externalities: as a collective action 
problem. Although everyone knows that using antibiotics in many cases is 
irrational in the long run, without some mechanism to ensure that others 
will behave, no one refrains. 
The common pool model offers yet a third way to characterize the 
problem. Common here means the absence of property rights. When no 
one has property rights, and an asset is part of the great unclaimed com-
and testimony by infectious disease specialists, surgeon had duty to patient to prescribe antibiotics to 
prevent possibility of serious bacterial infection entering patient's bloodstream); Hellwig v. Pot! uri, No. 
90-C-55, 1991 WL 285712, at *I (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 27, 1991) (holding physician liable for failing to 
prescribe antibiotics to patient who stepped on a rusty nail). 
79 TODD SANDLER, GLOBAL CHALLENGES: AN APPROACH TO ENVIRONMENTAL, POLITICAL, AND 
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 76-82 ( 1997). 
80 Tisdell, supra note 77, at 429. 
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mons, an asset grab occurs. The customary example is a fishery: if anyone 
can fish, a flood of participants will exhaust the stock rapidly. Given the 
ability of fish to regenerate if harvested judiciously (e.g., throwing back 
small fish; not fishing during certain times of year; generally, leaving in the 
water a population sufficient to regenerate itself), such hasty depletion is 
likely suboptimal.81 
However we choose to model the problem, any solution must somehow 
discourage some present low-value use to preserve the potency of antibiot-
ics for future high-value cases. In terms of the standard demand curve, we 
need to eliminate purchases by those at the bottom of the curve in early pe-
riods so that there are doses left to service the high part of the curve in later 
periods. 
high 
value 
FIGURE l 
low 
vatue 
quantity 
Gardner and Layton, apparently unaware of Tisdell's work, con-
structed a more sophisticated model and reached the same general conclu-
sion: sound policy should somehow deter low-value uses and preserve 
effectiveness for future high-value uses. 
Essentially, the social planner saves some of the treatments for future genera-
tions. In the unregulated case, no one 'owns' the treatments, and so there is no 
incentive to save them . . . . Some individuals will not now treat their disease, 
because it is 'too' expensive and some diseases no longer will be treated with 
81 For a discussion of the classic "common pool" situation, a fishery with no restraints on entry, see, 
for example, PHILIP A. NEHER, NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS: CONSERVATION AND EXPLOITATION 
11-59 (1990). For typical legal applications of the concept, see Gary D. Libecap & James L. Smith, The 
Economic Evolution of Petroleum Property Rights in the United States , 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 589 (2002); 
Randal C. Picker, Security Interests, Misbehavior, and Common Pools, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 645 (1992). 
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antibiotics because the benefits do not exceed the full cost to society. The 
treatment will be saved for someone more sick in the future. 82 
They highlight the trade-off between (high-value) human and (low-
value) animal use of antibiotics (as a growth enhancer in livestock, dis-
cussed supra Part II) in even starker terms. 
Put provocatively to emphasize the point, when both humans and animals use 
antibiotics we are equating the economic value of improving human life a bit 
more with extra pounds of beef .... [H) ow are vegetarians of any nationality 
compensated for the fact that we might one day in the future exhaust our mira-
cle drugs so that others can have cheaper beef today?83 
B. Generalizing the Problem: The Exhaustible Resource Model 
The previous subsection noted that one way to conceptualize the prob-
lem of antibiotic overuse was to view the resource as a common pool in 
which nobody has property rights. The analogy drawn to a fishery is not 
quite accurate. Antibiotics do not have the ability to reproduce them-
selves.84 Perhaps surprisingly, the proper analogy is to exhaustible re-
sources, such as minerals. Although we can manufacture as many doses of 
penicillin as we please, over time more and more bacteria will achieve re-
sistance. When most bacteria have such resistance, an antibiotic is 'ex-
hausted.' Thus, the number of effective doses of an antibiotic is limited, in 
almost exactly the same sense that the number of barrels of oil on the Earth 
is limited. This subsection introduces the economics of exhaustible re-
sources, and discusses the application of this theory to the special case of 
antibiotics. 
1. Basic Model.-Exhaustible resources' defining characteristic-
exhaustibility-requires a different economic analysis than conventional, 
reproducible goods. If there is a fixed, finite amount of some good (say, 
coal), then a decision to consume the good today forecloses future options: 
to consume that unit in a year, in ten years, or a hundred. This does not 
hold for more typical reproducible goods, such as paper. If demand for 
wheat unexpectedly rises in the future, past consumption in no way limits 
suppliers' ability to crank up production. Owners of exhaustible resources 
(public or private) thus must consider the ramifications of present use for 
future availability in a way that producers of reproducible goods do not.85 
82 Gardner Brown & David Layton, Resistance Economics: Social Cost and the Evolution of Anti-
biotic Resistance, I ENV'T & DEV. ECON. 349, 354 (1996). 
83 /d. at 355. 84 Note that to the extent antibiotics could regain usefulness if shelved for some period, they would 
share with a fishery a self-reproductive nature. Some models of optimal use of antibiotics rely on this 
analogy, infra Part IV.F, but, as previously discussed, supra Part II, the most recent scientific evidence 
suggests that reversing resistance by pulling antibiotics from use will not work. 
85 NEHER, supra note 81, at 271-86. 
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Although most explications of exhaustible resource economics stress 
the famous "Hotelling rule," that the price (or "rental") of such resources 
will rise at the interest rate,86 the basic insight about the special nature of 
exhaustible resources is best illustrated by assuming that the interest rate is 
zero (i.e., ignoring it). This treats as equal welfare in the present and all fu-
ture periods. 
This equality of present and future welfare would seem to obviate the 
need to carefully plan the timing of consumption of an exhaustible resource. 
If, however, producers face rising costs (as is often the case), the producer 
of an exhaustible resource will behave differently than the producer of a re-
newable good. Imagine that a large number of miners own all of the 
world's gold deposits. All face the same costs, and, since they are small, 
their output has no effect on price-they are classic competitive market 
"price takers." We can use the following standard supply and demand dia-
gram to contrast the profit-maximizing behavior of exhaustible and repro-
ducible good producers. 
average 
CO$t demand 
curve 
quantity 
FIGURE2 
To maximize profits, the supplier of a reproducible good keeps making 
units until the market price just covers the cost of the last unit made-
marginal cost. The flat demand curve means that marginal revenue equals 
market price. Thus, we have a well-known result from the economics of the 
86 See infra text accompanying notes 88-90. 
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firm: to maximize profits, produce up to the point where marginal costs 
rise to equal marginal revenue.87 
This standard economic logic does not work for exhaustible resources. 
Supplying a quantity up to the reproducible output level today means that 
there will be fewer units to sell later. These same units could have been 
produced at lower cost in a subsequent period; this is because costs are ris-
ing at the reproducible profit-maximizing output level. The producer of an 
exhaustible resource could increase profits by selling less now and more in 
the future. Taking this cost minimization logic to its limit, the exhaustible 
resource seller will always produce at that level of output that minimizes 
average (per unit) cost in each period. Given that the price (i.e., demand) 
does not change over time or with variations in output, this strategy yields 
the maximal possible profit on the producer's fixed supply of the good. 
Note that the exhaustible resource firm, despite the fact that it operates 
in a competitive market, earns positive economic profits-its total revenues 
(price x units sold) exceed its total costs (per unit cost x units sold). This 
difference, called rent, is the return on the exhaustible resource. If a firm 
buys a stock of an exhaustible resource, it will pay a price that reflects this 
future stream of rents. In that case, we can see, there are not really any true 
economic profits; the difference between price and average cost is just suf-
ficient to recompense the buyer of the exhaustible resource for its purchase 
price. 
Our assumption that interest rates are zero is unrealistic, of course. In 
order to focus on the effect of interest rates on the supply of exhaustible re-
sources, we now assume that costs of production are zero. This is not en-
tirely at odds with reality; costs are a small fraction of price for many low-
cost oil producers, and for drugs with patent protection. 
The real import of considering positive interest rates is that we are now 
considering a world in which there are multiple assets among which inves-
tors may choose. Our mindset becomes that of an investor assembling a 
portfolio of assets in which to invest. To simplify, we assume that there are 
only two assets: the exhaustive resource and government bonds that pay 
some fixed, positive interest rate. 
Government bonds, like most financial assets, can provide investors 
with two types of gain. The periodic interest payments are direct income. 
If the market interest rate changes, the price of the bonds themselves may 
rise (or fall); this is a capital gain (or loss). 
Exhaustible resources, unlike bonds, yield no direct income like inter-
est payments or the dividends paid by most stocks. The only way in which 
an exhaustible resource owner can earn a positive return is by capital 
gains-which is just an increase in the price of the resource. 
87 WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND EXTENSIONS 358 (3d 
ed. 1985). 
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We are interested in determining the equilibrium conditions necessary 
for investors to hold both bonds and supplies of the exhaustible resource. If 
one asset or the other would yield an unambiguously higher return, every 
investor would desire that asset and no one would want to hold the other. 
Such conditions, where nobody wants one of the assets, cannot be in equi-
librium. In equilibrium, the total return of the two assets, direct income 
plus capital gains, must be equal. Only then will investors be willing to 
hold both. 
To simplify matters, we assume that the return on the exhaustible re-
source is riskless, so that investors demand no risk premium for investing in 
it. We also assume that the price of bonds does not change, eliminating the 
possibility of capital gains on bonds. The total return on bonds is then sim-
ply the direct income they yield in the form of interest payments. As noted 
above, the total return on the exhaustible resource consists of capital gains 
in the form of price increases. Thus equilibrium requires that the rate of 
price increases for the resource equal the interest rate on bonds. 
To see why this is the only equilibrium, consider the two alternatives to 
equality of bond interest rates and resource price increase rates. If resource 
prices increase at a rate below the interest rate on bonds, all producers will 
extract every unit today so that they can invest the proceeds in bonds and 
watch their wealth grow more quickly than it would if they let the resource 
remain in the ground.88 This flood of supply will drive the price of the re-
source down to a very low level. Assuming the market demand curve has 
significant slope, then any supplier wise enough to hold back his supply 
will be able to sell her small quantity-the only supply available-at a high 
price in the next period. This later price may exceed the earlier price by a 
percent greater than the interest rate; if so, all the suppliers who sold will 
wish they had not. Thus, prices increasing more slowly than the interest 
rate cannot be if interest rates are positive. 
The other possibility, where the resource price increases at a rate ex-
ceeding the interest rate on bonds, is also an unstable (i.e., not an equilib-
rium). Under this condition, we would observe exactly the opposite of the 
situation described in the previous paragraph. With the capital gains (price 
increases) from simply sitting on the resource exceeding the interest income 
of bonds, investors would stampede to sell bonds and buy the exhaustible 
resource. Thus the only equilibrium path for prices is to increase at pre-
cisely the rate of interest; this is called the Hotelling Rule.89 The following 
diagram illustrates how industry supply "creeps up" the demand curve, sup-
88 This extreme result is due to our assumption that production is costless; if there are production 
costs, they would place some constraint on the rate of extraction, though our analysis in general will still 
hold. This assumption leads to almost identical results as assuming that marginal costs are positive but 
constant-i.e. , per unit cost does not rise or fall with quantity produced. 
89 See Harold Hotelling, The Economics of Exhaustible Resources, 39 J. POL. ECON . 137 (1931). 
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plying smaller and smaller quantities at higher and higher prices; it assumes 
an interest rate of ten percent. 
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end? It ends at the "choke price," where demand disappears. The begin-
ning is a little more subtle. Given this terminal point as defined by the 
choke price, the initial price and quantity combination from the demand 
curve (quantity q 1, at price of ten) is set so that, if prices rise at the rate of 
interest, the sequence of quantities that follow will add up to the total sup-
ply of the exhaustible resource.90 
If we admit positive costs, the basic story still holds, but the quantity 
that must increase at the rate of interest is not the price, but rents on the ex-
haustible resource: price less cost. This embodies the return on the re-
source itself; the costs of production represent payments to labor and capital 
hired to extract the resource. 
2. Property Rights Problem Remains.-Perhaps the most surprising 
result in the study of exhaustible resources is that, for competitive exhausti-
ble resource markets satisfying idealistic market conditions, the supply de-
cisions of competing sellers leads to socially optimal use. As long as no 
owner or group of owners of the resource has monopoly power, their pri-
90 Although the analysis is more complex, the same argument holds if there is no choke price, i.e., 
the demand curve approaches a zero quantity for very high prices but never actually goes to zero. Intui-
tively, the size of the quantities demanded at very high prices get extremely small-so small that even 
though we are summing an infinite number of them, the sum is finite. As long as income and wealth, 
external parameters, are finite, demand for any product cannot be infinite. 
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vate interests will lead them to deplete the resource at precisely the same 
rate as a benevolent social planner. At bottom, this is simply an application 
of the First Theorem of Welfare Economics, which says, roughly, that a 
competitive market without externalities (or other distortions) leads to an 
efficient allocation of all goods. 91 
There are a couple of direct implications of this market-efficiency re-
sult. First, it tells us that the behavior of monopolists generally is sub-
optimal for exhaustible resources just as it is for 'normal' non-exhaustible 
goods. This Article will discuss this at some length in Part IV.D, when ex-
amining the effect of patents on the market for antibiotics. 
More fundamentally, the antibiotics market does not satisfy the condi-
tions of the First Theorem of Welfare Economics for the reason discussed 
supra Part IV.A. To recap the argument, the fact that present use of antibi-
otics erodes future usefulness, combined with a lack of property rights in 
antibiotics, creates a negative externality. There is in effect a missing mar-
ket, between future sufferers of serious bacterial infections and present suf-
ferers of mild and possibly non-bacterial infections. Without some 
mechanism to discourage current low-value uses, it is not surprising that we 
cannot count on private ordering to produce socially optimal results. 
3. Differing Focus in Applying the Exhaustible Resource Model.-
The basic (dosage effect only) exhaustible resource models provides a 
more sophisticated setting in which to study the root problem identified by 
Tisdell, the externality that exists because use of antibiotics erodes future 
usefulness. Other recent scholarship using this approach has focused on a 
different set of issues. Borrowing methods from epidemiology, these more 
detailed models factor in effects not contained in our simple models.92 First, 
they account for the fact that antibiotics confer a positive external benefit: 
cured patients are less likely to spread the disease. Second, they explicitly 
examine the issues raised by the existence of multiple antibiotics, with dif-
fering levels of resistance to each. 
In other ways, these models are more limited. Of paramount impor-
tance, they do not distinguish between high-value and low-value uses of an-
tibiotics. By assuming that cures to all infections are of equal value, these 
models cannot study the fundamental trade-off in antibiotic use policy.93 
They are instead designed to model the course of a specific infection in a 
91 DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MJCROECONOMIC THEORY 199-205 (1990). Efficiency here 
means Pareto optimality: nobody can be made better off without reducing the welfare of someone else. 
92 Sebastian Bonhoeffer et al., Evaluating Treatment Protocols to Prevent Antibiotic Resistance, 94 
PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 12, I 06 ( 1997); Ramanan Laxminarayan, Bacterial Resistance and the Op-
timal Use of Antibiotics, RESOURCES FOR FUTURE (June 2001) (unpublished discussion paper 01-23), at 
http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-DP-OI-23.pdf(last visited Oct. 25, 2004). 
93 Laxminarayan explicitly values the cure of all infections equally. Laxminarayan, supra note 92, 
at 7. Bonhoeffer eta!. use a number of welfare measures that implicitly do the same. Bonhoeffer et al. , 
supra note 92, at 12, I 06-{)8. 
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closed environment such as a hospital; this Article, following Tisdell, fo-
cuses on the more general, worldwide problem. 
This Article ignores the positive externality of antibiotic use (reduction 
in spread of bacterial infections) as a second order effect. Patients will of-
ten spread the disease before they are diagnosed and given antibiotics, and 
they can continue to spread the infection even when taking antibiotics, up to 
the time they are cured (free of the infectious agent). This positive external-
ity is much more significant for vaccines, since those vaccinated can never 
become a breeding ground for a particular infection. The bottom line is 
that, in the long run, this paper assumes that the negative externality stem-
ming from excessive use far outweighs any positive externalities antibiotics 
offer. 
C. Policy Alternative One: Pigovian Tax and Related Mechanisms 
Maintaining our focus on this fundamental trade-off between current 
use and future usefulness, this section and the next analyze the efficacy of 
government policies designed to curb present use so that antibiotics retain 
their efficacy for serious infections in the future. This section first casts se-
rious doubt on the medical community's "command and control" proposals 
to deal with overuse of antibiotics. It then discusses the classic solution to 
negative externalities, a tax on the undesirable conduct (here, use of antibi-
otics), and some related subsidies for goods that reduce the need for antibi-
otics (tests to determine the cause of infections; vaccines that obviate the 
need for antibiotics). Part IV .D discusses the pros and cons of patent rights 
as a solution to the lack of property rights in antibiotics. 
1. The Medical Community's Command/Control Response.-With 
the crumbling of the Iron Curtain and the economic reforms in China, com-
mand and control as a means to allocate scarce resources (i.e., run an econ-
omy) is generally on the wane. It retains a rather shocking vitality, 
however, in proposed solutions to the overuse of antibiotics. Major medical 
organizations, medical researchers, and legal commentators all have fo-
cused exclusively on regulatory command, along with education and jaw-
boning (trying to persuade people to act selflessly and refrain from the anti-
social overuse of antibiotics), as the proper tools for reducing low-value 
uses of antibiotics. 
A major congressional study of the overuse of antibiotics conducted in 
1995 contains not one significant discussion of using prices or other eco-
nomic levers to address overuse of antibiotics, perhaps because the expert 
panel that authored the study included not a single economist or social pol-
icy expert.94 In discussing the costs of controlling emergence of resistant 
strains, the report discusses various aspects of hospitals' financial incen-
94 OTA, supra note 18. This repon does mention extending patents for manufacturers of new anti-
biotics willing to limit sales to patients infected with bacteria resistant to existing drugs. I d. at 18. 
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tives with nary a word about imposing a tax to alter those incentives.95 It 
suggests, inter alia, detailed rules and 'formularies' to regulate the use of 
antibiotics. 96 
Three years later, in 1998, the Center for Science in the Public Interest 
suggested the following measures to deal with the problem: 
• national funding for programs to educate health professionals and 
the public on the problem of antibiotic overuse; 
• require tests to identify infectious agents before prescribing anti-
biotics; 
• use government hospitals as "showcases" for the prudent use of 
antibiotics; 
• require hospitals receiving federal Medicare/Medicaid dollars to 
offer vaccinations; and 
• limits or bans on some agricultural and husbandry uses of antibiot-
ics, along with education for farmers. 97 
Just two years ago, the high-powered Interagency Task Force on An-
timicrobial Resistance, composed of all the major governmental agencies 
with an interest in health policy, listed as its top priority items: 
• a society-wide education campaign, and 
• "educational and behavioral interventions" to assist doctors in 
curbing antibiotic use. 98 
Not one of these large-scale policy documents authored by sophisti-
cated governmental and private institutions so much as contemplates using 
taxation or other mechanisms to alter private incentives. 
The same criticism applies to policy proposals from the medical acad-
emy. A recent editorial in the leading American medical journal advocated 
the use of traditional and computerized practice guidelines and education 
95 /d. at 93. 
96 Id. at 11-12. 
97 Ctr. for Sci. in the Pub. Interest, Protecting the Crown Jewels of Medicine, A Strategic Plan to 
Preserve the Effectiveness of Antibiotics (1998), at http://www.cspinet.org/reports/abiotic.htm (last vis-
ited Feb. 19, 2004). 
98 Interagency Task Force on Antimicrobial Resistance, A Public Health Action Plan to Combat An-
timicrobial Resistance: Part 1: Domestic Issues, 21-22 (June 5, 2002), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/actionplan/aractionplan.pdf. The Task Force consisted of the Cen-
ters for Disease Control ("CDC"), the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"), the National Institutes of 
Health ("NIH"), the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the Health Resources and Services 
Administration, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Defense, the Department of Veterans 
Affairs, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), the U.S. AID, and the Agency for Health Re-
search and Quality. 
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(of both doctors and their patients) to discourage overuse of antibiotics.99 
Another study made much the same recommendations, along with advocat-
ing restrictions on some uses of antibiotics. 100 Legal commentators simi-
larly have focused their recommendations almost exclusively on regulation 
and education. 101 
The efficacy of such measures is questionable. Education will not lead 
a self-interested patient to refrain from requesting antibiotics. Indeed, full 
knowledge of the private benefits of indiscriminate antibiotic use may lead 
to more, rather than less, antibiotic use. Jawboning seems best understood 
as attempting to instill a new norm that people will obey based on either an 
internal moral voice or on the disapproval and informal sanction of others. 
Ingraining a new norm may take a long time, as this is best done with chil-
dren. Relying on social disapproval and informal sanctions seems unlikely 
to work well, as the use, and especially the overuse of antibiotics is largely 
secret. Attempting to recruit doctors to express disapproval of patients who 
request antibiotics excessively also is problematic, both because physicians 
have special duties to their patients, and because competition among doc-
tors means that patients can simply switch doctors if refused a desired pre-
scription. 
The case against direct command-and-control regulation is subtler. 
Regulating antibiotics entails a strict limit on the number of doses adminis-
tered, or strict guidelines on use. For a government with complete informa-
tion, these measures might be sensible. If, however, doctors and their 
patients have better information on the costs and benefits of the various 
uses of antibiotics, top-down regulation in effect prevents them from using 
this information in deciding when to use antibiotics and when to refrain 
from use. A tax or subsidy, on the other hand, by its very nature, will 
eliminate only lower-value uses. It permits the parties 'on the ground' deal-
ing with the problem to draw on their superior information when they de-
cide where and when to economize on the use of a taxed resource. 
Moreover, the costs of enforcing command-style regulation of antibi-
otic use might be quite high. Some governmental agency would need to 
monitor millions of prescriptions a year and somehow ferret out cases of 
misuse. We should expect that most patients and their doctors would not 
cooperate, but rather might scheme together to circumvent laws that, in 
their view, unfairly deprive a patient of potentially helpful antibiotic treat-
99 Benjamin Schwartz et al., Editorial, Preventing the Emergence of Antimicrobial Resistance: A 
Call to Action by Clinicians, Public Health Officials, & Patients, 278 JAMA 944 (1997). 
100 Rosamund J. Williams & David L. Heymann, Containment of Antibiotic Resistance, 279 
SCIENCE 1153 (1998) . 
101 See Scott B. Markow, Note, Penetrating the Walls of Drug-Resistant Bacteria: A Statutory Pre-
scription to Combat Antibiotic Misuse, 87 GEO. L.J. 531 (1998) (advocates using Medicare and Medi-
caid rules layered on top of state regulation); Michael Misocky, Comment, The Epidemic of Antibiotic 
Resistance: A Legal Remedy to Eradicate the "Bugs " in the Treatment of Infectious Diseases, 30 
AKRON L. REV. 733 (1997) (similar regulatory approach). 
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ment. It would require very extensive monitoring of prescription practices 
to enforce national mandates on the use of antibiotics. The government 
would have to hire inspectors to keep close tabs on all antibiotic prescrip-
tions nationwide. This is an expensive proposition. Given doctors' and pa-
tients' incentives, and the ease of lying about the variety of infections being 
treated, monitoring prescriptions might prove insufficient. Another set of 
inspectors would need to devise some means to detect such fraudulent prac-
tices-adding on yet more costs. 
For these reasons, this Article proceeds on the premise that 'hard' eco-
nomic incentives, such as taxes, subsidies, and changes in patent rights, are 
much more effective measures than legislative fiat, jawboning, and educa-
tion. 
2. Pigovian Taxation.-Perhaps the most common solution to nega-
tive externalities like the one caused by antibiotic use is the imposition of a 
tax that forces those creating such external costs to "internalize" (take into 
account) the burdens they impose on others. These are called Pigovian 
taxes, in honor of A.C. Pigou, the first economist to discuss such a measure 
formally. 102 In his seminal article on overuse of antibiotics, Tisdell pro-
posed just such a tax. 103 
Neither Tisdell nor anyone else, however, has considered the implica-
tions of the exhaustible resource model for Pigovian taxation of antibiotics. 
For most negative externalities, such as pollution, the Pigovian tax per unit 
remains constant-the harm from pollution, as a baseline assumption, does 
not vary over time. Such a constant tax, however, will not work for antibi-
otics. Recall that efficiency requires the cost to consumers of an exhausti-
ble resource to increase over time at the rate of interest. Only such a rising 
tax will limit use over time efficiently, by raising the price paid by consum-
ers and thus imposing an ever-rising disincentive to use. If the initial price 
is set incorrectly, the price will be suboptimal in all succeeding periods. 
The Pigovian tax, then, is subject to larger cumulative errors in the context 
of exhaustible resources. 
That said, there is evidence that such a price mechanism and the law of 
demand (quantity demanded varies inversely with price) would work for 
antibiotics. When Iceland stopped subsidizing the price of antibiotics, use 
fell significantly. 104 Congruently, an Australian commentator has blamed 
the continuance of such subsidies for exacerbating antibiotic resistance in 
that nation. 105 
102 A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920). 
103 Tisdell, supra note 77, at 432. 
104 Joan Stephenson, Icelandic Researchers Are Showing the Way to Bring Down Rates of Antibi-
otic Resistant Bacteria, 275 JAMA 175 ( 1996). 
105 D.P. Doessel, The "Sleeper" Issue in Medicine: Clem Tisdell 's Academic Scribbling on the 
Economics of Antibiotic Resistance, 25 INT ' L J. SOC. ECON. 956 (\998). 
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The higher prices resulting from Pigovian taxation would indirectly in-
duce many of the measures that would be difficult to implement by direct 
regulation. For instance, if it is true that supplementing animal feed with 
antibiotics to enhance growth is one of the lowest-value uses of the drugs, 
these will be among the first consumers taxed out of the market. As long as 
the cost of the tax exceeds the benefits of growth enhancement, livestock 
producers will discontinue their use. Similarly, higher prices would lead 
those with mild infections, especially when the infection is likely viral, to 
refrain from using antibiotics. This is precisely what the tax is supposed to 
do: push those who value antibiotics the least out of the market. 106 
3. Subsidizing Tests.-The higher prices for antibiotics resulting 
from Pigovian taxation would also create greater incentives for using vari-
ous tests to determine if an infection is bacterial, and, if so, whether the bug 
is resistant to any antibiotics. The potential value of such tests is signifi-
cant. According to one panel of experts, "[t]he most powerful weapons in 
the arsenal directed at antibiotic-resistant bacteria are techniques for the 
rapid and accurate identification of bacteria and determination of their sus-
ceptibility to antibiotics. "107 
At present, most such tests are expensive and time-consuming. Cultur-
ing and identifying microbes extracted from patients can take weeks. If a 
test determines that the infection is bacterial rather than viral, lab techni-
cians must then undertake a second battery of tests to ascertain those antibi-
otics to which the germ is resistant. There are, however, a few new tests on 
the horizon that yield results much more rapidly. Results from a throat 
swab can determine if strep. bacteria are causing an infection in about fif-
teen minutes. 108 Such progress, however, appears to be the exception rather 
than the rule: "rapid technologies that would produce useful diagnostic re-
sults during the course of an office visit are not on the immediate hori-
zon."109 
Past scholarship has not discussed an additional efficient policy that is 
the mirror image of the Pigovian tax on antibiotics: a Pigovian subsidy to 
lower the cost of such tests. Because they will reduce the use of antibiotics, 
tests confer a positive external benefit on future patients with serious infec-
tions who will need the drugs. In addition to subsidizing the cost of such 
tests, the state might wish to subsidize research to develop faster and more 
106 Infra Part JV.I (discussing the distributional and equity issues raised by higher prices for antibi-
otics). 107 OT A, supra note 18, at 24. 
108 Children's Clinic of Southwest Louisiana, Inc., at http://www.childrensclinicofswla.com/labora-
tory.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2004) ("If strep throat is suspected, she will swab the throat for a rapid 
strep test. ... Within 10-15 minutes your physician will return with the lab results and continue his 
exam."). Note that this test does not determine what resistances, if any, the bacteria possess. 
109 OTA, supra note 18, at 51-52. 
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accurate tests. The remainder of this subsection explains the economics be-
hind these policy recommendations. 
Testing for the type of microbe responsible for an infection, in order to 
limit antibiotic use to cases involving a susceptible target, adds a second 
policy dimension. Our first dimension, in effect, was serious versus non-
serious illnesses. A Pigovian tax addresses this distinction by pricing the 
non-serious cases out of the market for antibiotics. Testing introduces a 
second dimension: illnesses caused by bacteria susceptible to a given anti-
biotic versus all other sources of infection for which the antibiotic would be 
useless (viruses, other microbes, and resistant strains of bacteria). 
In a world without any tests to determine microbial susceptibility to an-
tibiotics, there is no choice but to deploy antibiotics in all serious cases 
where it is even moderately likely that the drug will work-the alternative 
would be to never use antibiotics. This illustrates that, although a Pigovian 
tax will price non-serious cases out of the market, it cannot address this 
second source of counterproductive use of antibiotics, in cases where an in-
fection will not respond to such treatment. 
If such tests 110 are available, a now-familiar issue arises: individual and 
societal welfare gains from such tests diverge, for reasons quite similar to 
the negative externality of antibiotic use. Private decisions will compare 
the costs of the test (defined broadly, to include items such as the psychic 
expense of postponing treatment until the test results are available) to the 
expected cost of the antibiotic, its price multiplied by the percent chance 
that the drug would not help. 
To illustrate, assume that there is a twenty-five percent chance that an 
antibiotic will not work in a specific case, and that the antibiotic costs $10. 
If a test to determine the efficacy of the drug costs $1, then a risk-neutral 
patient would pay for the test, as the expected saving from using the test, 
$2.50 (twenty-five percent chance it saves $1 0) exceeds the cost of the test. 
If the test costs more than $2.50, however, it is not in the patient's self-
interest to use the test. 
These personal calculations, however, ignore the social benefit that 
arises when patients use the test: reducing current prescriptions by twenty-
five percent, thus preserving those effective doses for future serious suscep-
tible infections. 111 Continuing with the numerical example from the previ-
11° For simplicity, we assume that a single test both identifies the infectious agent and, if it is bacte-
rial, determines its resistance to antibiotics. · 
111 The exhaustible resource model implies that the number of effective doses is fixed. Doses not 
administered today are effective tomorrow on a one-to-one basis. This, admittedly, is a simplification. 
The evolution of bacterial resistance likely is more complicated. For example, the geographical disper-
sion of use might well affect the speed with which bacteria develop resistance. The scientific literature 
contains no precise measurement of the factors that determine the rate at which bacteria develop resis-
tance. Part II, supra, cited some findings ; in particular research suggesting that, once developed, resis-
tance is unlikely to disappear. Part IV .H, infra, discusses models in which resistance evolves with the 
pure passage of time, regardless of the number of doses administered. 
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ous paragraph, assume that a future victim of a susceptible infection would 
be willing to pay (in present value terms) $20 to insure that present users 
did not exhaust an antibiotic. Then there is an additional social gain of $5 
(a $20 gain in twenty-five percent of cases) from the use of the test. From 
the viewpoint of social optimality, then, we want patients to take the test as 
long as it costs less than $7.50 (private gain of $2.50 from potential saving 
in personal antibiotic costs, plus this $5 social gain due to preserving the ef-
ficacy of the antibiotic). In terms of the table presented above, using the 
test gives us additional discrimination power, beyond a Pigovian tax, to 
economize on the use of antibiotics in serious cases where the drugs will do 
no good. 
Non-serious Serious 
Bacterial 1 ~Ji9v;!?d\~,W:i~.io~t'"i proper cases for treatment 
Viral, . . . ! .. ·M ·'· ir" •.fgO,(,~~~~~~i' ' ,;ji,. :il;, .ijr. •ifl: . ;Jf;nled opt;;pyls~~~t,":~iw ,~i; .:ci kij,.,,; 
TABLE 1 
Generalizing these insights into more general economic terms, an af-
fordable test in effect reduces the demand for the antibiotic, as illustrated 
here. In an exhaustible resource market, a decrease in demand stretches out 
the useful life of the commodity. The sequence of prices that would ex-
haust the resource in a world of higher demand no longer do so. In the face 
of lower demand, then, the initial price of the resource is lower, it rises at 
the rate of interest (Hotelling's rule), and, finally, it takes longer to reach 
the "choke price" at which demand ceases. 
This means that, consistent with the implications of the simple numeri-
cal examples above, the test stretches out the useful life of the antibiotic. 
Recall from those examples that purely private incentives will lead to less 
than optimal use of tests for antibiotic efficacy. This is simply the inverse 
of the overuse of antibiotics in the absence of a Pigovian tax. Such overuse 
presented a negative externality; potential users of the test provide a posi-
tive externality. In such cases, the state should offer a subsidy to lower the 
price of tests for antibiotic efficacy. A properly calibrated subsidy will in-
crease use of the test to a level consistent with maximizing its utility to so-
ciety as well as to individuals. 
4. Subsidizing Vaccines.-Tests to determine the nature and resis-
tance of infectious agents are not the only source of positive externalities in 
antibiotic policy. Vaccines (treatments that prevent infection in the first 
place) offer two positive externalities, one enmeshed with antibiotic policy, 
the other independent of our concerns. Most policy analysis of vaccines fo-
cuses on the latter: for many diseases, vaccinated individuals cannot carry 
the pathogen, and thus cannot serve as a vector to spread it. Unvaccinated 
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people pose a positive threat to the community; hence laws often mandate 
vaccinations (frequently at a price of zero, to spur compliance). 112 
The second, to-date-ignored positive external effect implicates antibi-
otic policy: anyone vaccinated against bacterial disease X will never need 
an antibiotic for the disease, as the vaccine renders them immune. If every-
one is vaccinated against disease X, the disease itself may disappear, and 
the antibiotic can be deployed against diseases Y and Z (for which there 
may be no effective vaccination). 
As with the use of the tests discussed in the previous section, this (with 
some positive probability) translates into an incremental effective dose of 
the antibiotic in the future. It seems very difficult, however, to find a way 
for a future beneficiary of this preserved effective dose to compensate the 
vaccinated party, and we have the now-familiar positive externality. As 
with the test in the previous section, the government should subsidize the 
price of vaccinations because, in addition to helping control the spread of 
disease, they economize on the use of our exhaustible supply of antibiotics. 
For similar reasons, the government might want to subsidize vaccina-
tion research. Given the ready availability of many antibiotics over the last 
fifty-odd years, the market for such vaccines may have been stunted. Now 
that we are beginning to realize that antibiotics are an exhaustible resources, 
it may be sensible to invest public funds in vaccines-and any other similar 
treatments that will reduce the extent to which we dip into the limited pool 
of effective doses of antibiotics. 
5. Subsidizing or Socializing Information Gathering-Governmental 
information gathering, or subsidization of private efforts, may comprise an-
other efficient tool in societal efforts to preserve the effectiveness of antibi-
otics. For example, data on the statistical likelihood that various symptoms 
result from a given bacteria, along with data on the likelihood that each an-
tibiotic will work against that bacteria, might offer a rough-and-ready, cost-
effective way to decide quickly what antibiotic, if any, to prescribe. Simi-
larly, data on the geographic spread of resistant strains could enable doctors 
to target antibiotic usage more narrowly and effectively. 
Here, as is common for the production of information, private incen-
tives to construct the data may be suboptimal. First, it is difficult to exclude 
anyone from obtaining the information; once it is revealed, controlling its 
spread is problematic. This will make it difficult for producers of such in-
112 Massachusetts passed the first law mandating vaccinations, requiring all school children to re-
ceive vaccination against smallpox. John Duffy, School Vaccinations: The Precursor ro School Medi-
cal Inspection, 33 J. HIST. MED. & ALLIED Scl. 344, 346 (1978). "By the 1980-81 school year, all 50 
states had [mandatory vaccines] covering students first entering school." Kevin M. Malone & Alan R. 
Hinman, Vaccination Mandates: The Public Health Imperative & Individual Rights, in LAW IN PUBLIC 
HEALTH PRACTICE (Richard A. Goodman et al. eds., 2003). The Supreme Court ruled that mandatory 
vaccination programs are constitutional in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. II (1905) (holding state 
law requiring smallpox vaccination did not violate any Due Process Clause liberty interest). 
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formation to generate enough revenue to cover their costs. A few early pur-
chasers can resell or gift away the information. Potential producers, fore-
seeing their inability to get paid for assembling the informational data, will 
simply refrain from engaging in such an unrewarding enterprise. 
Moreover, use of the information is non-rivalrous: unlike a hamburger, 
"consumption" of the information to treat patient X in no way makes the in-
formation unavailable or useless to patient Y. Under such circumstances, 
the optimal price for this public good is zero. Private markets cannot pro-
vide efficient amounts of such goods. 113 
Admittedly, in some cases private parties may have incentives to pro-
duce some of this information. For example, a firm that has developed a 
new antibiotic (over which it has a patent-created monopolyY 14 might find it 
profitable to garner data demonstrating to doctors and their patients that this 
new drug works where existing antibiotics do not. There is indeed such 
private data-gathering. 115 In general, however, it seems unlikely that private 
parties will have incentives to produce all of the wide variety of data useful 
in economizing on the use of antibiotics. 
At present, there is no national program for compiling data on the 
prevalence and types of resistant bacteria. Some states collect relatively 
limited data; even this has proved productive. For example, one such data-
base enabled the state of Washington to pinpoint quickly the cause of an 
outbreak of e.coli infections. Nevada, without a reporting and monitoring 
apparatus, had a similar outbreak that lasted much longer, and for which the 
state never did identify the source of the infection (making recurrence more 
likely). 116 Unfortunately, the trend over the last decade or so has been less, 
rather than more, governmental surveillance of the resistant bacteria 
threat. 117 
D. Policy Alternative Two: Patents 
In sketching the regime of public information gathering, subsidies for 
tests, and taxes on antibiotics necessary to deter inefficient overuse of anti-
biotics, the discussion in the previous section was notably silent on the 
magnitude of the information gathered, the subsidies given, or the taxes im-
113 NICHOLSON, supra note 87, at 706-16. 
114 Patents are discussed at length in Part IV.D. 
115 Antimicrobe Spy Network, 277 SCIENCE 185 (1997). Note that the government cannot compel 
private information owners to disclose data without paying just compensation. Ruckelshaus v. Mon-
santo Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (holding that trade secret is a compensable property interest for purposes 
of Takings Clause). 
116 OT A, supra note 18, at 63. 
117 See R.L. Berkelman et al., Infectious Disease Surveillance: A Crumbling Foundation, 264 
SCIENCE 368 (1994); David P. Fidler, Legal issues Associated with Antimicrobial Drug Resistance, 4 
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES (1998), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol4no2/ 
fidler.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2004). 
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posed. This was a dodge, for calibrating these measures is extremely diffi-
cult. 
Thinking about the optimal tax rate illustrates the problem. In order to 
mimic the efficient price path over time for an exhaustible resource, the tax 
on an antibiotic must rise over time at the rate of interest. As discussed ear-
lier, such price increases are necessary to eliminate incentives to either sell 
all of the resource immediately (if the price increases at a rate lower than 
prevailing interest rates), or to withhold the resource indefinitely (if the 
price increases exceed prevailing interest rates). This alone is not unduly 
complicated; all the taxing authority need do is select the proper interest 
rate and raise the tax by that percent each period. What is difficult is de-
termining the appropriate initial level of the tax. This depends critically on 
both supply (the cost structure for making a given antibiotic) and demand. 
Public officials do not have very good information about either, and obtain-
ing even crude estimates could be quite expensive. An error in setting the 
initial tax rate will result in suboptimal tax rates for the entire working life 
of the antibiotic. Finally, note that because the supply and demand for each 
antibiotic differs, often substantially, the state would need to select a differ-
ent initial tax rate for each antibiotic. 
Pharmaceutical firms likely have better information on costs of making 
antibiotics, and on the structure of demand for each drug. It would not be to 
their fmancial advantage, however, to provide the government with honest 
estimates. There is another way, however, to draw on this knowledge: give 
firms monopoly rights in antibiotics. This, of course, is already done, at 
least for limited terms, via the patent system. 
It should not be surprising that patents offer at least a partial solution to 
the problem of excessive use of antibiotics. As discussed in the introduc-
tion, absence of property rights in effective doses of antibiotics is one way 
to conceptualize this problem. A patent creates a legally-protected monop-
oly on the right to produce, and a legal monopoly is a very powerful prop-
erty right-the power to exclude the world from selling the product. The 
remainder of this section analyzes the benefits, and the costs, of using pat-
ents instead of taxation to curb overuse of antibiotics. 
1. Traditional Benefits and Costs of Patents.-The usual justification 
for rewarding inventors with monopoly rights, called patents, is "a practical 
utilitarianism: reward the creator of a useful thing, and society will get 
more useful things .. . this mode of thought . . . is the core of all patent sys-
tems."118 The patent system is thus part of a market economy; it harnesses 
the inventiveness of self-interested individuals to share their discoveries 
118 ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW & POLICY: CASES & MATERIALS 2 (3d ed. 
2002). 
644 
HeinOnline -- 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 645 2004-2005
99:611 (2005) Preserving a Precious Resource 
with society by offering a reward in the form of a monopoly over the inven-
tion for some period oftime (today, typically twenty years). 119 
It is important to emphasize that, in the context of antibiotics, we are 
studying a second, distinct facet of a patent monopoly that is not relevant 
for most other goods. The traditional purpose of the patent system, encour-
aging innovation, remains relevant for antibiotics, but we are focusing on 
the fact that a patent monopoly creates property rights that help mitigate 
overuse. 
For most products, the fact that the government grants a monopoly is 
an evil for the usual reason: monopoly sellers restrain supply below the op-
timal level, raising prices above marginal cost, in a manner that maximizes 
their private profits at the expense of social loss (the so-called "deadweight 
loss" attributable to monopoly). 120 Patent monopolies, however, are neces-
sary evils, since they provide the incentive to invest in innovation. 
For antibiotics, it is not clear that monopolization is less desirable than 
a free market, which suffers from the negative externality caused by a lack 
of property rights. Because of this externality, prices above marginal cost 
are desirable: these higher prices will constrain demand by discouraging 
low-value uses, and preserving doses for more serious cases. Note that it is 
in the self-interest of the patent holder to serve this social end. 
In addition to the interaction of a patent monopoly with the negative 
externality, we must account for the effects of a monopoly in a market for 
an exhaustible resource like antibiotics. If monopolization involved no 
deadweight loss in such markets, patents would provide an ideal solution to 
the problem of antibiotic overuse. 
Unfortunately, as demonstrated in the following section, a monopolist 
controlling an exhaustible resource, like a monopolist over a regular 'repro-
ducible' good, raises prices too much, at least initially. Thus, there seems 
no 'perfect' market structure to address overuse of antibiotics. A free mar-
ket, which is usually efficient, prices antibiotics too low because of the ex-
ternal effect of present use on future usefulness. A monopoly for this 
exhaustible resource has the same defect as all monopolies: mispricing that 
leads to rnisallocation. 121 
119 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000). The Drug Price Competition & Patent Term Restoration Act of 
1984 gives patent holders partial compensation for patent time lost in the drug approval process. /d. 
§ 156. 
120 JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 66--{;8 (1988). If the demand curve 
is horizontal, and in rare other cases (for example, a good with constant elasticity of substitution), mo-
nopoly prices (and quantities) will equal the efficient, competitive outcome. !d. For antibiotics effective 
against both some serious conditions and some minor irritants, the demand curve will have a downward 
slope, reflecting, inter alia, the fact that people will pay more to treat more serious illnesses. 
121 This excessive price, in addition to blocking some desirable transactions, may indirectly cause 
overuse of the tests discussed in the previous section that identify infective agents and their drug resis-
tances. Recall that antibiotics priced too cheaply (not reflecting the negative externality of low-value 
use) led to underutilization of such tests. The test is economically desirable only if its cost is more than 
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It is possible to imagine a market structure that would price antibiotics 
efficiently. The idea is to determine the optimal number of doses in each 
period (say, 100,000), and grant licenses giving each of a large number of 
competing firms (say 1000) the right to produce a small fraction of the total 
(here, 100,000/1000, or 1 00). Selling the drug without such a license would 
be illegal. Since no firm would have significant market power, none would 
withhold supply; thus, together the firms would sell all licensed doses-by 
assumption the efficient outcome. The following table summarizes how 
this licensing regime relates to a free market and a monopoly market by 
separating out monopoly from property rights. 
Property Rights in No Property Rights in 
Antibiotics Antibiotics 
Monopoly Patent world; likely that Natural monopoly, barriers 
antibiotics under- to entry, or some other force 
produced creating monopoly; under-
production, as in case of pat-
ent monopoly (this regime 
not discussed in text) 
Competition Licensing regime (large Competitive market; anyone 
number of firms, each can produce antibiotics, they 
with license to service are sold at marginal cost, and 
small portion of market); thus are over-produced 
efficient outcome 
TABLE2 
In order to avoid the deadweight loss associated with patent monopo-
lies, there have been recurring calls for a "reward" or "bounty" system, un-
der which the government, instead of granting inventors a patent monopoly, 
would make a one-time cash payment (reward), place the new invention in 
the public domain, and presumably competition would insure that it sold at 
marginal cost. 122 Such a system would be undesirable for antibiotics, how-
ever, because of the central problem studied in this Article: marginal cost 
outweighed by the private benefit of using the test: finding out drugs will not work and saving the cost 
of the drug. The cheaper the drug, the less desirable the test is. Monopoly, with an artificially high 
price, presents the flip side of this scenario. Faced with this steep price for a treatment that may not 
work, consumers will use the test in cases where the cost of the test exceeds its social benefits because 
the artificially high price of the drug does not reflect its true social costs. 
122 Robert C. Guell & Marvin Fischbaum, Toward A/locative Efficiency in the Prescription Drug 
Industry, 73 MILBANK Q. 213 (1995); Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging 
Innovation, I 13 Q.J. ECON. 1137 (1998); Douglas G. Lichtman, Pricing Prozac: Why the Government 
Should Subsidize the Purchase of Patented Pharmaceuticals, II HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123 (I 997); Steven 
Shavell & Tanguy Van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525 
(2001). For a detailed analysis of these and other proposals, see Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Pat-
ent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115 (2003). 
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pricing of antibiotics leads to excessive use. Prices in excess of cost, 
though perhaps not as high as monopoly prices, are positively desirable. 
There is one set of circumstances under which monopolists will price 
efficiently: when they have the ability to price discriminate perfectly. Such 
a price discriminating seller has detailed information on the demand of each 
customer, and thus charges each the maximal price that they are willing to 
pay. Each customer, then, pays a different price, hence the label "discrimi-
nation." This requires monopoly power, of course, for if there is competi-
tion, any attempt to charge higher prices to those with more intense desire 
for the good would simply drive those customers to other sellers who stand 
ready to undercut any price above cost. 
A price-discriminating monopolist can capture all possible gains from 
trade with her customers, and thus when she maximizes her private gain she 
is also maximizing social gain. In the market for antibiotics, this means that 
a price discriminating seller would never have the incentive to sell doses to 
low-value users (at a low price) because such sales would later cost her 
sales at a high price. This solves the basic negative externality of the anti-
biotic market. The ability to price discriminate means that, unlike a "regu-
lar" monopolist who must charge one price to all comers, such sellers have 
no need to restrict supply and charge everyone a high price; they can "creep 
down the demand curve" to capture efficient sales without undermining 
their profits from sales to those willing to pay the highest prices. 
Perfect price discrimination in practice is impossible; what seller has 
enough information to size up individual buyers and accurately gauge the 
highest price each is willing to pay? The welfare implications of imperfect 
price discrimination are ambiguous. When monopolists are only able to di-
vide up buyers into a few large groups and charge different prices to each 
group, the outcome may be superior to a one-price monopoly, but also may 
be worse. 123 Similarly, when monopolists try to separate ("screen") con-
sumers with a menu of bundles with different prices, the result may be bet-
ter or worse than the outcome under simple monopoly.124 
Drug makers may be able to engage in fairly fine-tuned price discrimi-
nation. The holder of a patent for an antibiotic that is the ·sole treatment for 
some class of serious infections (e.g., vancomycin, discussed in Part II) can 
charge a higher price for that drug than for an agent mainly used to treat 
minor illnesses. Patent holders may even be able to engage in price dis-
crimination in the sales of a single substance. The owner of a drug effective 
against both serious infection A and mild infection Z could market the drug 
under two trade names, with an expensive version authorized for use 
against A and a cheaper version authorized for use against Z. 
Admittedly, price discrimination in markets for medical treatments has 
been politically controversial. This issue has proved a hot button in the 
123 TlROLE,supranote 120, at 139. 
124 !d. at 149 ("The welfare analysis of nonlinear tariffs is ambiguous."). 
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context of a very similar product, vaccinations. For example, it may well 
be economically sensible (efficient) for a patent holder to charge lower 
prices in less wealthy nations. Yet at a congressional hearing, "Senator 
Paula Hawkins asked a major vaccine manufacturer how it could justify 
charging nearly three times as much to the United States government for 
vaccines as to foreign countries .... " 125 Similarly, President Clinton, with a 
rhetorical flourish, said "I cannot believe that anyone seriously believes that 
America should manufacture vaccines for the world, sell them cheaper in 
foreign countries, and immunize fewer kids as a percentage of the popula-
tion than any nation in this hemisphere but Bolivia and Haiti."126 
In response to this adverse publicity, U.S. manufacturers stopped sub-
mitting bids to supply vaccines to developing nations. 127 Curtailing this 
form of price discrimination might well have been inefficient; as long as the 
vaccine makers were able to charge at least marginal cost to poorer nations, 
and those nations presumably found such a price attractive, the pressure to 
charge one price to all comers destroyed some gains from trade. This ex-
perience indicates that political considerations may render infeasible eco-
nomically desirable (i.e., efficient) policies like price discrimination. 
Pragmatic policymakers need to realize the additional constraints imposed 
by public opinion that, for whatever reason, do not square with economic 
logic. 
2. Effect of Monopolies and Limits on Their Terms in Exhaustible 
Resource Markets.-lf antibiotic patent holders cannot engage in 
effective price discrimination, and instead must select one price, we know 
that they will generally price above the competitive level in the exercise of 
their market power. This model of monopoly behavior continues to apply 
over time in the dynamic context of the exhaustible resource model. 128 
To understand profit-maximizing strategy for monopoly owners of ex-
haustible resources, recall the discussion of competitive markets 129 in a 
world of zero marginal costs. Under competition, the market moved up the 
demand curve so that, per Hotelling's Rule, quantity decreased each period 
so that prices could increase at the rate of interest. Any sharper price rise 
cannot be an equilibrium because it would induce sellers to refrain from 
selling; any lower price rise conversely cannot be an equilibrium because it 
would induce all sellers to dump the good immediately. 
125 Michael Kremer, Public Policies to Stimulate Development of Vaccines and Drugs for Ne-
glected Diseases 24--25 (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.whoindia.org/EIP/CMH-
Report/CMH%20Papers/02_07.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2005). 
126 /d. at 25 n .9 (citing MITCHELLS. VIOLAINE ET AL.., THE CHILDREN' S VACCINE INITIATIVE: 
ACHIEVING THE VISION ( 1993)). 
127 /d. 
128 The following discussion is based on JON M. CONRAD, RESOURCE ECONOMICS 86-88 (1999). 
129 Supra Part IV. B. I & fig.3. 
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In that competitive market, there were, as usual, no economic profits. 
A monopolist can do better. Under the simplifying assumption of zero 
costs, a monopolist will want to maximize discounted revenue over time. If 
the proceeds from the sale of a small amount of the resource (technically, 
marginal revenue) in one period exceed the discounted value of the pro-
ceeds that could be obtained by waiting to sell the same unit in the follow-
ing period, the monopolist would sell her entire stock at present; holding 
even one unit would be inferior to selling the unit and investing the pro-
ceeds at the rate of interest. Conversely, if the marginal revenue in the next 
period exceeded the current marginal revenue by more than the rate of in-
terest, the monopolist would have no incentive to sell any units today. 
Thus, by an argument similar in structure to that for competitive markets, 
we reach a similar but not identical conclusion. Instead of moving up the 
demand curve so that prices increase at the rate of interest, a monopolist 
chooses quantities so that her marginal revenue rises at the rate of interest. 
In other words, she moves up her marginal revenue curve instead of the 
demand curve. 130 The following picture, then, illustrates the usual state of 
affairs, when the marginal revenue curve lies below the demand curve. 
price 
10 
6 
4 
quantity 
Except in unusual circumstances (e.g., when the industry demand 
curve is horizontal), this means that prices for an exhaustible resource un-
der monopoly will rise less rapidly than in a competitive market. The key 
130 Empirically, it can be difficult to calculate what portion of an exhaustible resource monopolist's 
price reflects market power, as opposed to rent on the resource. See, e.g., Gregory M. Ellis & Robert 
Halvorsen, Estimation of Market Power in a Nonrenewable Resource Industry, 110 J. POL. ECON. 883 
(2002) (finding prices above marginal cost in nickel industry stem from monopoly power, not implied 
rent due to owners of nickel deposits) . 
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to understanding this result is to note that the marginal revenue curve, ex-
cept in the aforementioned unusual circumstances, lies below the demand 
curve and has a steeper slope. Whenever a monopolist decides to sell one 
more unit, the demand curve dictates the price, which is average revenue 
(revenue per unit sold). Thus revenue on this marginal (one more addi-
tional) unit equals the new, lower price, as we move down the demand 
curve a bit. The drop in price, however, means that there is a negative ef-
fect on revenue: the price received for all the units except this last (mar-
ginal unit) falls. This latter negative effect makes marginal revenue decline 
faster than prices taken from the demand curve. 
Consider, as indicated in Figure 4 supra, an initial price of 10, paired 
with some quantity sold of q~, and assume the interest rate is 50%. 131 In a 
competitive market, Hotelling's Rule dictates that the price must rise by this 
50%, from 1 0% to 15%, in the second period. This translates into only q3 
units transacted. Under a monopoly, however, the marginal revenue when 
q1 units are sold is only 4. It is this quantity, not price, that increases at the 
interest rate (50%). Thus, the second period sales under monopoly decrease 
only to q2, where marginal revenue is 6 and the price (jumping up the de-
mand curve) is definitely Jess than 15. This same story repeats itself at each 
step; moving up the marginal revenue curve leads to gentler price increases 
than under competition. 
There is one more step in comparing the two market structures. If a 
competitive market will exhaust some stock of an exhaustible resource by 
starting at some price Pc and reaching the choke price (a price high enough 
to drive demand to zero) in some time period tc, a monopolized market can-
not start at this same price, Pc· Since prices increase more slowly under 
monopoly, such a price path would induce greater quantities transacted in 
each period, and thus would exhaust the resource before the price reached 
the choke price. Such a path, however, cannot be optimal for a monopolist, 
since she could have raised her initial price (and thus, under Hotelling's 
Rule, all subsequent prices) by some amount and enjoyed greater profits by 
finishing at the highest possible price, the choke price. 
This demonstrates that a monopolist in an exhaustible resource market 
will charge a higher initial price than would prevail in a competitive market. 
From this higher initial price, we can draw a further, perhaps surprising 
conclusion: a monopolist will take longer to sell off the exhaustible re-
source than would a competitive market. If this were not the case, i.e., if 
the monopolist exhausted the resource in a shorter time (or the same time), 
we immediately reach a contradiction. We know that the competitive price 
path will exhaust the resource. Starting at a higher price and finishing ear-
lier (or at the same time) means that the quantity sold under monopoly must 
be lower than under competition (with equality in the last period). But then 
131 I have used such a high interest rate to illustrate starkly the difference between the demand curve 
and the marginal revenue curve; the result does not depend on this choice. 
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the total quantity sold under monopoly will be less than under competi-
tion-i.e., such a price path will not exhaust the resource. This cannot be 
an equilibrium because the monopolist could earn more by selling the left-
over resources in some or all periods. To sum up, a monopolist will charge 
an initial price higher than the market, increase prices less rapidly, and these 
together imply that a monopolist will prolong the time over which the re-
source gets used. 
Monopoly is only the first half of the story. Because patents do not 
grant monopoly rights forever, their limited term may affect owners' behav-
ior. The holder of a patent for a normal, non-exhaustible resource maxi-
mizes profits by producing at the same output during each period. This is 
not generally true for the holder of a patent on an exhaustible resource. If 
the patent term is longer than the period over which a monopolist facing no 
time constraints would exhaust the resource, the monopolist will simply fol-
low her most-preferred plan; in this case, the patent's time limit isn't a 
binding constraint. 132 
If, however, the patent term is shorter than the unconstrained exhaus-
tion period, the limited term will affect the way in which the patent holder 
behaves. Not surprisingly, the limited term works in the opposite direction 
of monopoly power. We have seen that monopoly power causes the owner 
of an exhaustible resource to raise initial prices and stretch consumption 
over a longer period. A limited patent term, by destroying the possibility of 
monopoly pricing after expiration, puts pressure on the monopolist to move 
sales forward in time, forcing a reduction in the initial price charged. 
In most cases, the Hotelling Rule for monopolists applies: the patent 
holder's marginal revenue must rise at the interest rate. As long as the pat-
ent period is not "too short," a profit-maximizing, time-limited monopolist 
will still exhaust the entire supply of the resource. In order to do so, she 
must start at a price lower than she would if she faced no time constraint. If 
the patent period is sufficiently short, a monopolist can earn a greater profit 
by ignoring all intertemporal allocation issues and behaving like a monopo-
list in a normal (non-exhaustible resource) market, keeping price constant at 
the profit-maximizing level. 
The socially optimal patent term is indeterminate. We know that the 
consumption pattern for an unconstrained monopoly begins below the op-
timal path, but stretches consumption out over a longer period. A patent 
that places a binding time constraint will induce the monopolist to charge 
lower prices in order to sell all units of the exhaustible resource within the 
constrained period. If the patent period is long enough for the monopolist 
to exhaust the resource, this same general result will hold: the constrained 
monopolist will begin with prices higher than desirable and quantities 
lower, but will eventually charge lower prices. It is possible, however, that 
132 The discussion that follows is based on DANIEL LEONARD & NGO VAN LONG, OPTIMAL 
CONTROL THEORY & STATIC OPTIMIZATION IN ECONOMICS 230--35 (1992). 
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the patent period will be so short that the monopolist will choose to charge 
the simple, fixed monopoly price and will not exhaust the resource in the 
patent period. 
The key indisputable economic fact here is that an exhaustible resource 
monopolist without any time constraint will initially price the good higher 
than optimal, and will stretch out the useful life of the resource. For antibi-
otics, this means that a monopolist will price out of the market some mod-
erate-value consumers, such as a patient with a painful but not serious 
bacterial infection. This is the cost of monopoly. The benefit is that the 
patent holder will maintain the utility of the drug for a longer-than-optimal 
time. If society is risk-averse, this is an attractive trade-off. Granting anti-
biotic inventors very long-term patents trades off some short-term moderate 
pain in return for ensuring the ability to treat the most serious illnesses fur-
ther into the future. 
3. Reimposing Patents.-Relatively short patent terms have left vir-
tually every important antibiotic in the public domain, and thus marketable 
at the usually low cost of production. Now that we realize the advantages 
of maintaining property rights in antibiotics for longer terms, a seemingly 
radical policy may be in order: re-establishing patent rights in some key an-
tibiotics that have gone off-patent. Just to reiterate the lessons of the previ-
ous subsection, a patent establishes very strong property rights in an 
antibiotic, and the holder of those rights has private incentives to sell the 
drug to only relatively high-value users. One obvious candidate is vanco-
mycin, a critical antibiotic of last resort for some lethal infections, that went 
off-patent decades ago. 
Although eminently sensible as an economic policy, this proposal may 
seem radical from a legal perspective. After all, the purpose of patents is to 
encourage creative activity-the Constitution explicitly so states in the 
Copyrights and Patents Clause. 133 That same clause declares that such 
rights are "for limited Times .... " 134 It seems impossible to argue that re-
imposing patent monopolies will induce inventors to greater efforts. Once 
something goes off-patent, is not it supposed to stay in the public domain 
forever? 
Although there is no law directly on point, the answer to that question 
is probably "no." In the recent decision Eldred v. Ashcroft, 135 the Supreme 
Court upheld congressional extension of existing copyrights. Although not 
precisely the same as reinstituting patents, the Court's opinion strongly 
suggests that Congress has very broad powers to enhance copyrights and 
patents retroactively. 
133 U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts .. .. "). 
134 !d. 
135 537 u.s. 186 (2003). 
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In addition to the indirect support that Eldred provides, reinstituting 
patent status uses a traditional means to achieve a classic government end: 
privatizing property rights to solve a collective action problem created by 
antibiotics in the public domain. The government has awarded property 
rights for similar purposes time and again. The United States sold off most 
of the land in America's vast public domain based on the assumption that 
private owners would put it to more productive use than the government. 
The government establishes monopoly rights in bands of the electromag-
netic spectra in order to prevent simultaneous use of frequencies that would 
render broadcast radio and television, cell phones, and other devices unus-
able. 
These examples, of course, are only analogies. It may seem that once-
patented products should be treated differently based on their origins as pat-
ents. Yet there seem to be no precedents or policies that require or counsel 
that products based on expired patents be treated differently from property 
with more mundane origins. Expired patents look much like expired gov-
ernment leases. The state as lessor grants time-limited rights in a portion of 
the public domain, but at the end of the term the government takes back 
possession and has unfettered rights to make the land a commons, fence it 
off, or re-let it to another individual. Reletting is analogous to reestablish-
ing patent rights. 
How should the government go about recreating patent rights? One 
possibility would be to simply grant a new patent to the original patent 
holder. This, however, seems hard to justify distributionally. The original 
patentee has already enjoyed the expected monopoly term. Granting them 
another patent would seem to be a windfall. 136 Expired patents are in the 
public domain, and so should be managed to benefit the public at large. 
Their interest seems best served by auctioning the patent rights to the high-
est bidder. The desired term may not be the usual twenty years. Thus the 
government might want to auction rights for longer periods. Alternatively, 
the state could conduct more frequent periodic auctions (e.g., annually, or 
even every five years), and decide at the end of each term whether or not to 
extend patent rights again. 
E. Patent Terms & Planning for Plagues 
Our concern with the patent term for antibiotics stems from their ex-
haustibility. For most goods, the main issue surrounding the choice of a 
patent term is to set it just high enough to encourage desired innovation. 
Excessively short patent periods provide too little incentive for innovation; 
excessively long patent periods impose a needlessly extended run of dead-
weight loss due to monopolization. 
136 See generally Eric Kades, Windfalls, 108 YALE L.J. 1489 (1999). 
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In the market for antibiotics, the nature of demand, when coupled with 
exhaustibility, supplies another reason for a longer patent period. The de-
mand for antibiotics is greatest when mankind faces some new bacterial 
plague. Such plagues, fortunately, seem to be rare events. Unfortunately, 
their timing is unpredictable. Economically, we can model bacterial 
plagues as random, sudden, short-lived explosions in demand for antibiot-
ics. Plagues are low-probability, high-cost disasters, like house fires or 
floods. As such, some sort of insurance scheme seems like the natural way 
to address the threat. During good times (no plagues), we should pay pre-
miums, in the form of refraining from the use of newer antibiotics for which 
resistance is rare or has not yet materialized. Society can then 'cash in' this 
insurance policy by using the reserved medication to eradicate the new and 
deadly microbe. Note that this is almost exactly what the holder of an 
unlimited or long-term patent does: charges higher prices in the short term, 
and stretches out the useful life of the drug. 
Alternatively, the government, by regulation, could place all newly-
developed antibiotics in a "lock box," barring their use until this reserve 
contains enough drugs to address the threat of a plague. Regulation putting 
new antibiotics in such a lock-box, however, would wreak havoc on private 
incentives to develop new antibiotics. 
One of the problems is that if we were to get a new class or new type of antibi-
otic, then people would want to save it and would therefore be reluctant to use 
it. One of the difficulties for the pharmaceutical industry is looking for some-
thing which ostensibly is not going to be used. 137 
One solution to this problem would be to socialize the development of 
antibiotics. The government could fund research and development, and 
forbid manufacture of the drugs it discovers until public health experts de-
cide that a plague exists. 
The fact that governments generally have limited their funding to basic 
research, leaving the development of medication to private pharmaceutical 
enterprises, suggests that the state may be a relatively inefficient drug de-
veloper and marketer. Thus it is worth exploring ways in which private or-
dering can create incentives for drug makers to squirrel away novel 
antibiotics to address the risk of a plague. 
The property rights created by patents can provide such incentives. 
The possibility of a plague, like any sudden explosion in demand, will 
translate into much higher prices for patent holders that postpone sales of a 
new antibiotic. It is this potential for reaping very large gains in the event of 
a plague that may induce private actors to preserve antibiotic effectiveness, 
squaring their private calculus with the public interest. There are, however, 
at least two problems with this solution. 
137 Lenski , supra note 51, at 150 (comments of J.V. Copeland, SmithKline Beecham Consumer 
Healthcare (UK)). 
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First, the limited term of patents may short-circuit private incentives to 
postpone marketing a newly developed antibiotic. It is quite possible that 
the odds of a plague within the patent period (twenty years, roughly) are 
small, even if the odds of a plague over a longer term approach one hundred 
percent, as seems likely. For example, assume that the odds of a bacterial 
plague appearing in any year are 0.5% (i.e., one in 200), and that the ab-
sence of a plague in one year has no effect on the odds of a plague appear-
ing in future years. Under this scenario, the chance that at least one plague 
will appear within twenty years are only ten percent, but there is a forty-five 
percent chance of such a plague over 120 years. 138 
The low odds of a plague within the patent period might well drive a 
drug patent holder to begin marketing it despite a societal interest in post-
poning use. This might seem counterintuitive: any prospective gains 
twenty years or more in the future will be discounted significantly under 
any realistic interest rate assumption and thus, make waiting for a plague 
uneconomical. 
This supposition, however, is not necessarily true. For example, if we 
keep the assumption that the odds of a plagues are 0.5% per year, assume 
that an antibiotic will work against only one such plague (such intense use 
likely will foster resistance in bacteria), apply a 3% real rate of interest, and 
assume that a plague raises demand for an antibiotic by a factor of 250, then 
putting a new antibiotic in a lock-box and saving it until the next plague re-
turns, on average, 7.75% more than immediately marketing the drug. 139 
Even though the expected date of the next plague is very remote and thus 
profits from sales at that date are discounted quite heavily, the extra revenue 
that stems from the explosion in demand during a plague is more than 
enough to outweigh near-term (and thus lightly discounted) sales in low-
demand conditions. In a nutshell, it is privately rational to shelve antibiot-
ics under these circumstances and wait for a big payday. 
The upshot of this example is that patents with very long terms may 
induce their owners, acting in self-interest, to preserve the effectiveness of 
antibiotics in anticipation of a plague. 140 One way to understand this result 
is to note that the usual limited-term patents create only temporary property 
rights; once a patent expires, the product immediately becomes a commons. 
138 If the odds of a plague in a given year are 0.5%, then the odds of no plague are 99.5%. The 
chance of avoiding a plague for N years is then (.995)N Since this probability and its converse, the odds 
of experiencing at least one plague, must sum to I 00%, the odds of one or more plagues within the next 
N years are simply I - (.995)N Using the numbers from the scenario given in the text, for twenty years 
we have I- (.995i0 = .095 (9.5%); for 120 years, I- (.995) 120 = .452 (45.2%). 
139 Appendix A, infra, derives these results. 
140 As a policy matter, infinite-term patents might well be optimal. The Constitution, however, only 
empowers Congress to create patents "for limited Times." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. That said, the 
Eldred ~ase, see discussion supra text accompanying notes 133-135, apparently permits Congress to 
renew intellectual property rights without limit; if so, Congress can create patents of infinite term by pe-
riodic renewal. 
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For goods without any externalities, this is desirable: price falls from an ar-
tificially high monopoly level to cost, increasing the number of transactions 
and thus eliminating deadweight loss. For antibiotics, of course, this de-
cline in price and increase in use is undesirable because of the now-familiar 
negative externality of current low-value usage. An extremely long-term 
patent preserves property rights in the antibiotic, and the holder of this 
property right, free from competition over any horizon, can withhold an an-
tibiotic until a period of extraordinary need (i.e., a plague). Strong property 
rights can make even a very long delay in selling a drug-i.e., putting the 
drug in a lock-box-attractive to self-interested patent holders. 
The benefits of very long-term patents, however, do impose greater 
deadweight losses. Although there is no apparent method by which to 
weigh this cost against the property rights benefits of long-term patents for 
antibiotics, there are strong heuristic grounds to believe that the benefits ex-
ceed the costs. First, precisely because bacteria develop resistance to them, 
antibiotics in effect have a built-in finite useful life expectancy. This sets 
an upper limit on the size ofthe deadweight loss from monopoly. Contrast 
this with a patent on, e.g., filters for liquids (oil, water) used in a broad ar-
ray of goods. Such filters may well be used for eternity, and thus society 
would suffer unending losses due to monopolization. 
Second, the monopoly power created by a patent over a single antibi-
otic may be quite limited. If the drug has effective competitors in the mar-
kets for all bacterial infections, it may confer little monopoly power. 
Moreover, those cases where significant monopoly power exists, i.e., where 
the drug is uniquely effective against a serious illness, are precisely the 
cases in which usefulness is valued most highly. 
Finally, risk aversion again weighs in favor of long-term patents. If 
society is risk-averse, it will not mind paying a 'premium' (in the form of 
longer-term monopolization) in order to 'insure' against disastrous plagues 
by creating incentives for patent holders to put some antibiotics in a lock-
box. The trade off, fewer treatments for less serious cases (that, in an ideal 
world, are efficient to treat) in order to preserve usefulness for the most se-
rious rash of cases, seems worthwhile. 
Society can, in theory, reach the true optimal consumption path by im-
posing the appropriate Pigovian tax instead of awarding long-term patents 
on antibiotics. This approach, however, will largely undermine the incen-
tives to research and develop antibiotics. In addition, as discussed earlier, 
setting the proper tax rate is extremely difficult. 141 To summarize that dis-
cussion, it requires that the government obtain detailed knowledge of costs 
and the demand for an antibiotic in each market where it remains effective. 
The patent approach, on the other hand, leaves pricing issues to a manufac-
turer that is closer to, and an expert in, the market for drugs. 
141 See supra Part IV.D. 
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This private ordering solution to planning for plagues via patents of 
very long duration depends critically on not only a free market for the sale 
of antibiotics today, but also on the confidence that such a market will exist 
in the future, especially in the event of a plague. Can the government credi-
bly commit to refrain from regulating prices in such dire circumstances, 
when voters express outrage over the high prices being charged for life-
saving medication? If pharmaceutical companies believe that the govern-
ment will cave to popular pressure and impose price restraints or other regu-
lations limiting their ability to reap the rewards of high plague demand, they 
will find shelving the antibiotic until a plague arises too risky. Instead, they 
will market the drugs immediately. This result is not socially desirable. 
This is an example of a general phenomenon, the so-called time-
consistency problem. Actors often wish to convince others that they will 
follow a certain course of action in the future. A monetary authority may 
wish to convince private actors that it will not inflate the currency. 142 A tax-
ing authority contemplating an 'amnesty' (waiving penalties for those who 
pay overdue taxes) will want to convince delinquent taxpayers that it is a 
one-time deal that the authority will never offer again. 143 Yet as time goes 
by, it may become attractive for the monetary and taxing authorities to de-
viate from their pre-announced commitments. If private actors foresee this, 
they will put little credence in the announced policies. Firms will expect in-
flation and factor that into their pricing and other decisions; taxpayers will 
figure that later amnesty offers will materialize and so be less inclined to 
pay their taxes. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that drug makers might lend little cre-
dence to a naked promise from the government to refrain from regulating 
drug prices when plagues strike. For example, in the face of the spread of 
anthrax via the mail in the fall of 2001, the makers of ciprofloxacin, the an-
tibiotic of choice to cure such infections, were under intense scrutiny. It 
appears that, contrary to economic logic, they decided not to raise the price 
of the drug despite an increase in production that likely raised their mar-
ginal costs. 144 Similarly, the makers of AIDS medications face ongoing 
pressure to reduce the price of their products. 145 How can the government 
credibly commit to resist widespread calls to place ceilings on the prices of 
key antibiotics if and when plagues strike? 
The government could try to commit itself by contract, promising to 
pay a pre-determined, relatively high price for an antibiotic in return for the 
142 Fynn E. Kydland & Edward C. Prescott, Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of 
Optimal Plans, 85 J. POL. ECON. 473 (1977). 
143 AVINASH K. DIXIT & BARRY J. NALEBUFF, THINKING STRATEGICALLY: THE COMPETITIVE 
EDGE IN BUSINESS, POLITICS, AND EVERYDAY LIFE 147 (1991). 
144 Bayer Cuts Price of Anthrax Drug, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED (Oct. 24, 2001), at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/anthrax/story/O, 1520,580129,00.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2004). 
145 Sarah Bosely, Glaxo Cuts AIDS Drug Prices in Africa, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED (Sept. 6, 2002), 
at http://www .guardian.co. uk/aids/story/0, 7369,78692 7 ,OO.html. 
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patent holder's agreement to keep the drug off the market until needed to 
treat a plague. It is not clear, however, if the government can bind itself 
convincingly under contract law. The general rule is that the government 
can take actions as a sovereign that may undermine the value of a contract 
to a party with whom the government previously contracted. 146 In Horwitz, 
the Supreme Court refused to award contract damages to a party whose con-
tract to purchase silk from the United States was erased by a general em-
bargo. 
It has long been held by the Court of Claims that the United States when sued 
as a contractor cannot be held liable for an obstruction to the performance of 
the particular contract resulting from its public and general acts as a sover-
eign ... . Jones v. United States, 1 Ct. Cis. 383, 384 .. . In the Jones Case . .. 
the court said: "The two characters which the government possesses as a con-
tractor and as a sovereign cannot be thus fused; nor can the United States while 
sued in the one character be made liable in damages for their acts done in the 
other. Whatever acts the government may do, be they legislative or executive, 
so long as they be public and general, cannot be deemed specially to alter, 
modify, obstruct or violate the particular contracts into which it enters with 
private persons . . . . In this court the United States appear simply as contrac-
tors; and they are to be held liable only within the same limits that any other 
defendant would be in any other court. Though their sovereign acts performed 
for the general good may work injury to some private contractors, such parties 
gain nothing by having the United States as their defendants."147 
Thus, patent holders might fear that the government could characterize 
its attempt to regulate antibiotic prices in general as a sovereign act which 
does not constitute a breach of contract. The courts do not always buy such 
arguments, 148 but patent holders might find the litigation risk of this issue 
too great. 
Another candidate mechanism for the government credibly to commit 
itself to refraining from price regulation is the just compensation require-
ment. There is no question that a patent is a property interest protected by 
Takings Clause. 149 Existing doctrine, however, suggests that price regula-
tion is only a taking if unreasonable. Specifically, courts have rejected 
landlord just compensation claims for residential rent control statutes as 
long as the statute provides them with a "reasonable" or "fair" rate of re-
turn.150 What amounts to a reasonable rate of return is of course debatable, 
146 Horwitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458 (1925). 147 /d. at461. 148 See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996). 149 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986 (1984). 150 See, e.g., Cromwell Assocs. v. Newark, 511 A.2d 1273, 1277 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985) 
("When the maximum increase allowable by the rent-control ordinance is insufficient to provide an effi-
cient operator a fair rate of return, the ordinance is unconstitutional .... "); see also Searle v. City of 
Berkeley Rent Stabilization Bd., 271 Cal. Rptr. 437 (Ct. App. 1990) (invalidating ordinance limiting rent 
increases to forty percent of inflation). For an enlightening discussion of the economic evidence that 
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and drug makers might again decide that it is too risky to bank on the size 
of just compensation awards to make them whole in the face of price regu-
lation. 
F. And When They're Gone ... 
Even with very long patent terms that create strong property rights in 
antibiotics, and with some policy to insure patent holders can reap large 
gains when plagues strike, the premise that antibiotics are an exhaustible re-
source means eventually they will be gone. What measures could society 
take in a post-antibiotic world? 
As antibiotic prices became prohibitively expensive, we could expect 
to see a range of responses. First, increasingly severe conditions would no 
longer merit the use of antibiotics. The first uses priced out of the market 
would be infections causing minor discomfort but without any threat of 
permanent disability or death. As antibiotics become increasingly scarce, 
bacterial infections causing significant pain and even disability would not 
merit the use of antibiotics. 
The government might consider approving the use of antibiotic agents 
previously rejected for toxicity or non-trivial side effects. A drug that 
causes severe nausea suddenly becomes attractive when the alternative is 
serious illness. 151 Still, bacteria will develop resistance to such substances 
as well, and thus this approach is merely a stop-gap. As a world without 
any antibiotics approaches, people probably would seek out more vaccina-
tions, conferring long-term protection against more serious bacterial infec-
tions. The returns to better hygiene would increase, and we might expect to 
see greater investments in cleanliness, both on the part of consumers and 
producers (e.g., restaurant and grocery employees). 
If these measures did not work, at some future date (the time frame 
admittedly is impossible to specify with any precision) people might limit 
their social interactions. Those most susceptible to sickness, especially the 
young and old, might risk exposure to others only when necessary. Alter-
natively, the vulnerable, and perhaps everyone, might wear protective gear 
in public. Masks covering the mouth and nose, along with gloves might be 
the first steps; if infectious threats become serious enough, people might 
don full biohazard suits, breathing only highly filtered air, drinking only 
highly filtered water, and never permitting any part of their skin to interact 
seems to demonstrate that rent control might be unreasonable even in the face of deferential review, see 
Chicago Board of Realtors, Inc. v. Chicago, 819 F.2d 732, 741-45 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J., in sepa-
rate majority opinion). 
151 In a slightly different vein, the FDA might want to rethink policy on substances so old that they 
are off-patent, but that have never been approved by the agency. For example, fusidic acid, an old, off-
patent drug, is effective against some strains of MRSA. The FDA, however, has never approved the 
drug, and no firm is willing to cover the cost of sheparding the drug through the approval process when 
it has no patent monopoly to guarantee a return. Other firms would simply free-ride on the efforts of 
those paying for obtaining approval. 
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directly with the external world. Admittedly such measures, in terms of in-
convenience and other psychic disutility, are very costly, but in a world 
teeming with untreatable infectious agents, people might be willing to make 
such sacrifices. 
G. Are Antibiotics Really an Exhaustible Resource? 
Perhaps, however, the premise of this Article is excessively pessimis-
tic. Although it seems true that individual antibiotics are exhaustible due to 
the evolution of resistance, the larger question is whether antibiotics as a 
class of drugs are exhaustible. This is as much an economic as a technical 
question; the key factor is the evolution of the cost of discovering novel an-
tibacterial agents. Even if there is an unending collection of discoverable 
drugs, if the cost of developing successive generations of them rises ex-
tremely rapidly, then economically (if not technically), the supply of antibi-
otics is exhaustible. 
There are some grounds to think that the cost of developing new anti-
biotics will rise. Scientists likely have "picked the low-hanging" fruit over 
the last sixty-odd years, scouring nature and finding most of the antibiotics 
developed naturally by molds, fungi, and other life forms that have battled 
bacteria for eons. There may be few such rich veins left to mine. 
On the other hand, the explosion in biological knowledge and tech-
niques (e.g., decoding bacterial DNA and determining the purpose of each 
gene) may reduce the cost of identifying new antibiotics. 152 Under the best 
scenario, the gains from such technical processes would swamp the diffi-
culty of finding non-natural agents. In this case, antibiotics would not be 
exhaustible at all; they would be like any reproducible good. Pharmaceuti-
cal companies could discover them at a predictable, decreasing cost. There 
would be no externality from any use; pricing at marginal cost would be ef-
ficient. Government intervention would be unnecessary. 
One team of economists seems to think that, if properly regulated, an-
tibiotics are more akin to a renewable fishery than an exhaustible mineral 
supply. 153 They build a model on the premise that antibiotics can "regener-
ate" their usefulness if not used too intensively. 
[T]he resource of resistance is much more similar to a renewable resource, in 
that it has the capacity to regenerate itself .. . so long as there is a more gen-
eral population of pathogens from which to draw, the reduction of the antibi-
otic application will afford the capacity for the pathogen population to evolve 
in a less directed fashion . . . . In this way, the resistant stock of a particular 
152 See, e.g., David Hughes, Exploiting Genomics, Genetics and Chemistry to Combat Antibiotic 
Resistance, 4 NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS 432 (2003). 
153 Timo Goeschl & Timothy Swanson, Lost Horizons: The Interaction of IPR Systems and Resis-
tance Management (Draft Feb. 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
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treatment may be considered as a renewable rather than an exhaustible re-
source.154 
Their key assumption is that "there is a not insignificant fitness cost to car-
rying a trait that is not currently being selected for" 155-i.e., resistant strains 
are at a fitness disadvantage to their susceptible kin when there is no antibi-
otic in the environment. If so, then "[i]f the treatment is withdrawn before 
the pathogen population is wholly virulent [resistant], then the level of viru-
lence [resistance] will again decline toward zero .... " 156 Based on their as-
sumptions, and given a sufficient number of antibiotics, they construct an 
equilibrium in which the pressure for resistance can be counteracted by 
withdrawing each antibiotic after some period of use and waiting for its ef-
fectiveness to "recharge" as bacteria not exposed to it lose their resistance 
because of the costs imposed by maintaining such resistance. 
The problem with this model is that its fundamental premise, that bac-
teria will lose resistance if an antibiotic disappears from their environment, 
does not appear to hold. As discussed at length earlier, 157 recent microbi-
ological research strongly suggests that (i) the costs of maintaining resis-
tance are often small to begin with, and (ii) resistant bacteria frequently 
experience further evolution that eliminates these costs entirely. In addi-
tion, resistance dissipates much more slowly than it spreads, as the costs of 
resistance in the absence of antibiotics apparently are much less than the 
benefits of resistance in the presence of antibiotics. 158 
Thus it appears that the only way to "escape" from the exhaustibility of 
antibiotics is to invent new ones continually. From a macroeconomic per-
spective, the relevant question is whether the costs of this development in-
crease at a rate noticeably higher than the growth rate of the economy as a 
whole. If so, then in a real sense the cost of developing new antibiotics will 
become more burdensome and in effect they would be an exhaustible re-
source. If the costs of discovering a new antibiotic requires, e.g., half of 
GNP, the drug is effectively undiscoverable. It is like gold observed on 
Mars by a telescope. Conversely, if national income grows more rapidly 
than the cost of developing antibiotics, the burden of cranking out new ones 
will continuously lighten. 
Goeschl and Swanson have expressed optimism on this score. "There 
is a virtually limitless number of methods for interfering in the basic proc-
esses of pathogen regeneration."159 Oddly, these economists state this tech-
nical assertion without a word about cost. According to a group of 
biologists, even without considering cost, this technical assertion is ques-
154 !d. at I. 
155 /d. at 2. 
156 /d. 
157 See supra text accompanying notes 51-57. 158 Bonhoeffer et al., supra note 92, at 12,1 07; 12, II 0. 159 Goeschl & Swanson, supra note 153, at 5. 
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tionable. "[T]here is more to be done than merely generating new antibiot-
ics-the pace of which cannot keep up with microbial resistance re-
sponses."160 If technical progress is no match for bacterial evolution, 
antibiotics indeed are an exhaustible resource. 
Technical progress may someday outstrip the ability of bacteria to de-
velop resistance, but any such happy era lies somewhere in the future. At 
present, many microbiologists seem to think that we face some non-trivial 
span of time over which the number of antibiotics will decrease rather than 
increase. Thus, even if the long-run prognosis is rosy, it seems that at pre-
sent we face a period of years over which antibiotics are effectively ex-
haustible. For this time span, then, it is sensible for public policy purposes 
to treat them as a depletable resource, so that we don't exhaust our supply 
of antibiotics before technology eventually comes to the rescue. Failing to 
take such a precaution may leave us exposed to the threat of an untreatable 
plague. 
H. The "Pure Time" Effect 
So far this Article has assumed that the only process by which antibiot-
ics lose their efficacy is use, i.e., that there is a fixed number of effective 
doses and no more, but also no less. Tisdell's overlooked article contains 
another possible effect ignored in subsequent scholarship: it might be that 
antibiotics become less useful by the mere passage of time. 161 This section 
demonstrates that if this "pure time" effect is significant, private ordering is 
much less likely to work and the government would need to regulate antibi-
otic use heavily. 
Tisdell finds that "[i]t is difficult to imagine relevant processes that are 
solely quantity-dependent or solely time-dependent . . . . In practice, the 
quantity of exposures to a new control technique and their time-pattern need 
to be simultaneously considered."162 The microbiology scholarship dis-
cussed in Part III suggests that Tisdell was on to something. Recall the fre-
quency with which bacteria swap snippets of genetic material (plasmids). 
Once a bacteria has developed resistance, then, it can pass this characteristic 
on to other bacteria even if the antibiotic is not in use. It is quite possible 
that a single plasmid encodes resistance to multiple antibiotics, say two: A 
and B. Then administering antibiotic A will create an environment favoring 
transfer of immunity to both antibiotics, even though nobody is receiving 
doses of antibiotic B. 
Thus it seems reasonable to assume that both the number of doses and 
the passage of time play a role in determining the effectiveness of antibiot-
ics. Indeed, other factors likely matter as well, e.g., the geographic spread 
16
° Carlos F. Amabile-Cuevas et al., Antibiotic Resistance, 83 AM. SCIENTIST 320, 320 ( 1995). 161 Tisdell, supra note 77, at 430. 
162 !d. 
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of use. Resistance to an antibiotic used in many cities with frequent travel-
ers likely develops more rapidly than if the same number of doses are used 
intensively in only one relatively isolated city. For expository clarity, how-
ever, we first will consider examples that focus on the "pure passage of 
time," and ignore all other factors. We will then consider a simple example 
combining the time effect with the dosage effect. 
Consider an antibiotic that remains useful for, say, five years, regard-
less of the number of doses administered. The optimal use pattern is obvi-
ous: start using it immediately and price the drug at marginal cost. Any 
delay reduces net social benefits with no offsetting gain. Thus, if antibiotic 
resistance increases with time from first use, instead of doses delivered, 
there is no externality from a lack of property rights: private ordering will 
immediately produce the socially desirable outcome, high production (down 
the demand curve all the way to marginal cost). 
In his pure time model, Tisdell arbitrarily assumed that demand for an 
antibiotic would increase over time. He gave no justification-and indeed, 
made no such assumption in his dosage model. Unsurprisingly, given this 
assumption he shows that if demand is increasing rapidly enough, it is effi-
cient to delay use of the drug. 163 This approach is unfortunate, as it masks 
the impact that a pure time effect has on the optimal policy: in the absence 
of expanding demand, it strongly favors use sooner rather than later. Fur-
ther, it makes pricing at marginal cost, the market outcome, socially opti-
mal. 
If there are multiple new antibiotics awaiting deployment, however, 
private ordering is almost assuredly suboptimal if effectiveness declines 
with the mere passage of time. A pair of examples contrasting a dosage 
model with one combining dosage and time effects helps illustrate this 
problem. Say that we have ten brand new antibiotics (label them A-J), and 
that each is good for 100 doses. The socially optimal level of antibiotic 
supply each period is 100 total doses, in any combination of the ten drugs. 
In a world where only the number of doses matters for the development of 
resistance, we could use the antibiotics in any pattern we wish, and still be 
able to depend on 100 doses for ten periods. At one extreme, we could use 
100 doses of A in period one, 100 doses of B in period two, and so on 
through 100 doses of J in period ten. At the other extreme, we could use 
ten doses of each antibiotic A-J in each period. In addition, we can use any 
averaging ofthese two extreme cases (e.g., twenty doses of antibiotics A-E 
in periods one to five; twenty doses of F-J in periods six to ten). 
Now assume that, in addition to the effect from doses administered, the 
number of effective doses of each of the ten antibiotics, once used, declines 
with time according to the following formula: you lose ten doses to the 
passage of time after one period, twenty doses after two periods, etc. The 
following table summarizes the total number of doses of all ten antibiotics 
163 !d. at 433-35. 
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available if, in each period, we administer ten doses of each of the ten anti-
biotics (100 per period, as in the previous paragraph). 
Period Stock at Loss due to Loss due to Stock remain-
start of doses time passing ing for next 
period administered period 
0 1000 
1 1000 100 100 800 
2 800 100 200 500 
3 500 100 300 100 
4 100 100 - 0 
TABLE3 
Under the combined influence of dosage and time effects, we will ex-
haust each of the ten antibiotics after four periods if we use all ten drugs 
simultaneously. 
If, instead, we use one drug per period, exhausting all I 00 doses before 
any time effect kicks in, we can still supply the desired level of doses for 
ten periods. Given that the pure passage of time detracts from the useful-
ness of the drugs, we want to use each in an intense burst; a pure time effect 
makes "blitzkrieg" use of individual antibiotics desirable as opposed to the 
simultaneous, modest use of all. Note that intense use of the drugs in seria-
tim fashion does not cost us anything if it turns out that only doses deliv-
ered matter. If, then, there is a reasonable possibility of a pure time effect, 
this insight provides a robust reason for seriatim, intense use of each antibi-
otic in tum. 
The market, unassisted, is unlikely to lead to this "burst" use pattern. 
Even if all ten drugs have equal, level marginal cost, the optimal use is only 
one of a continuum of equilibrium outcomes, and all other possibilities in-
volve the suboptimal simultaneous use of more than one drug. Society 
likely would need central coordination to deploy one drug at a time. If the 
costs of making each drug rise with quantity produced, then it is very likely 
that the market outcome involves the use of multiple drugs. Competitive 
pressure will lead firms to produce each drug up to the point equating the 
marginal costs of all in use. 164 The government would need to discourage 
use of all but one antibiotic, either by regulatory fiat, by imposing a suffi-
cient tax on all but one drug in each period, by using its power of eminent 
164 If separate firms have new patents on each drug, the problem is worse. Each firm will want to 
produce immediately for two reasons. First, the time value of money makes profits earned sooner more 
valuable than profits earned later. Second, the limited term of the patents may make waiting even more 
undesirable. The government will need to compensate patent holders to induce them to delay produc-
tion, with cash and perhaps also with extensions of their patents' terms. This Article discussed the role 
of patents in the antibiotic market at length. See supra Part IV.D. 
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domain to force patent owners to sell their rights to drugs that the govern-
ment wishes to shelve, or some other policy measure to ensure seriatim use 
of antibiotics. Reductions in antibacterial efficacy due to the passage of 
time, independent of doses administered, may be very important, then, in 
determining the policy measures that will best preserve the potency of anti-
biotics. 
/. Equity, Affordability, and Insurance 
Whether addressing resistance driven by the mere passage of time or 
by the number of doses administered, this Article so far has focused solely 
on the most cost-effective means by which to preserve the potency of anti-
biotics. Such efficiency arguments are the mainstay of economics. Before 
moving on to legal and political constraints on antibiotic policy in Part V, 
this subsection offers some comments on the issues of equity and fairness 
raised by the efficiency policies espoused in this Article. 
Either Pigovian taxation or extended patent terms will raise the price of 
antibiotics. This immediately raises an equity concern: what of those with 
serious infections unable to pay these higher prices? 
Following the conventional economic approach, this Article argues that 
policymakers should address efficiency and equity separately. The effi-
ciency discussions above weigh in favor of making prices reflect all costs, 
including the external cost of current antibiotic use on future users. To deal 
with any inequities created by these high prices, the government should use 
taxation and income transfer measures. To nutshell an extensive literature, 
the costs of undesirable transactions that result from mis-pricing antibiotics 
are greater than the costs incident to taxing income and redistributing it to 
the poor. 165 
In practical terms, this means that the government should subsidize the 
poor who need antibiotics, presumably under Medicaid. This is a form of 
(social) insurance. As with any form of insurance, it may create incentives 
for beneficiaries to behave suboptimally. In this case, of course, the worry 
is that the poor will demand excessive antibiotics based on the lower subsi-
dized price that they pay. This worry, however, may not pose a significant 
threat. After all, private insurers face the same problems (insured drivers 
have less incentive to drive carefully; insured businesses have less incentive 
to install safety equipment) yet these markets operate effectively and on a 
wide scale. Like private insurers, the government as a social insurer can 
adopt measures to curb beneficiary misbehavior. In our case, requiring the 
poor to pay for even a modest part of the price of antibiotics (a "co-
payment") will encourage them to forego use when their doctor has in-
165 For an introduction to this topic, see A . MITCHELL POLINKSY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW & 
ECONOMICS ch. 2 ("Efficiency and Equity") & ch. 17 ("Efficiency and Equity Reconsidered") (3d ed. 
2003). Summarizing, Polinsky states that "redistribution through the government's tax and transfer sys-
tem may be cheaper and is likely to be more precise." !d. at 10. 
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formed them that the infection is not serious and will clear up in a couple of 
days. · 
Middle-class and wealthier consumers can hedge against high antibi-
otic prices via private insurance (usually through their employer). In addi-
tion to requiring the co-payments (as discussed in the previous paragraph, 
for those insured by the government), private insurers might offer benefici-
aries a range of coverages. Those desiring antibiotics for any infection 
would pay relatively high premiums; others willing to forego antibiotics 
when they suffer non-serious infections would pay much less. Through co-
payments, variable coverages and premiums, and similar mechanisms, the 
price of antibiotics can affect the incentives of parties despite the fact that 
their insurer is picking up part or all of the tab for antibiotics. 
In theory, insurance (governmental or private) could work even in the 
extreme case of a bacterial plague. As an analogy, note that existing health 
insurance covers expensive procedures such as open-heart surgery by as-
sessing affordable annual premiums to everyone and covering the costs of 
the unlucky few who end up needing the procedure in a given year. The 
same basic "spreading" principle applies to antibiotics. Instead of a dribble 
of cases each year, however, plagues present a flood of cases every 100 
years, say. To cover the very high cost of efficiently-priced antibiotics, in-
surers would need to accumulate sufficient reserves in years without 
plagues to cover the huge expense of antibiotics warehoused for precisely 
this contingency. 
Such a private solution to high antibiotic prices during plagues could 
obviate the need for any government involvement in pricing policy. It is 
not clear, however, that insurers operate with this amount of foresight. 
Similarly, consumers may lack such foresight; if so, they would be unwill-
ing to pay for "plague coverage," and would flock to health insurers omit-
ting such coverage and charging commensurately lower premiums. Finally, 
it is possible that insurers would put pressure on the government to regulate 
prices in the event of a plague. Although it might seem that such firms (via 
management, employees, and shareholders) could not apply as much politi-
cal pressure as the mass of potential plague victims, the insurance industry 
looks like the kind of well-organized and well-funded "special interest 
group" capable of exerting considerable influence in political circles. 
Admittedly, the very wealthy may purchase antibiotics for minor infec-
tions. That said, all but the very wealthiest consumers are somewhat sensi-
tive to prices. If the cost of a course of treatment with a key antibiotic like 
vancomycin was $10,000, even someone making a million dollars a year 
would think twice before paying 1% of her annual income (close to 1.5% 
after taxes) to treat a trifling infection. It is important to note that the 
wealthy frequently would also be able to evade command-and-control regu-
lations on antibiotic use. They can travel to jurisdictions where enforce-
ment is lax or non-existent, find doctors willing to falsely assert that the 
patient has a serious infection, and obtain antibiotics through illegal chan-
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nels (witness the markets for illegal drugs). The bottom line is that there is 
no perfect mechanism to curtail the use of antibiotics. We must compare 
the cost of this "leakage" under the price system (very wealthy people using 
antibiotics to treat trivial infections) to the costs and limited efficacy of 
command-and-control regulations. 166 
V. NATIONAL LEGAL & INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF 
THE PROBLEM 
Having described the economically efficient means of dealing with re-
sistant bacteria and the distributional concerns raised by these policies, it 
remains to discuss the legal and political context, and constraints on poli-
cymaking in the real world. The intensifying scarcity of antibiotics over the 
coming years requires inter-jurisdictional solutions, as resistant bacteria 
have no regard for state or national boundaries-resistant bacteria do not 
politely wait for visas before crossing borders. If any states or nations con-
tinue to use all known antibiotics indiscriminately, its citizens will serve as 
a breeding ground for resistant bacteria that, in today's highly connected 
world, will soon spread around the globe. The following subsections exam-
ine this problem at two levels. The first considers the legal grounds for na-
tional regulation of antibiotics among the several states of America. The 
second weighs the practical policy issues presented in trying to make sure 
that poor as well as wealthy nations rationalize their consumption of antibi-
otics. 
A. National Dimensions 
To the extent the national government employs longer-term patents to 
curb overuse of antibiotics, the Constitution's allocation ofthe patent power 
exclusively to the national govemment167 affirms the federal government's 
power to act. Recent cases on state immunity from damage suits under the 
Eleventh Amendment might prevent Congress from authorizing damage 
suits against a state that decided to infringe an antibiotic patent, but the pat-
ent holder or the U.S. government could obtain an injunction ordering a 
state to cease production and distribution not authorized by the patentee. 168 
166 See supra Part IV.C.l. 
167 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have power to .. . promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries . .. . "). 
168 U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to ex-
tend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens 
of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. 
Expense Bd. v. Coli. Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment barred 
suits for monetary damages against states that infringe patents); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) 
(subjecting state officials to injunctive orders of federal courts). Note, however, that the Supreme Court 
in some cases has refused to entertain requests for injunctive relief against the states. Seminole Tribe v. 
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997). 
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If Congress decided instead to rely on regulation, the Commerce 
Clause would seem to provide ample grounds to assert federal authority. 
The negative externality of low-value antibiotic use presents precisely the 
type of activity with cross-border, or spillover effects, for which the Consti-
tution gives that federal government power to regulate under the Commerce 
Clause. 
One scholar seems to disagree: 
Congress probably does not have the authority to regulate antimicrobial pre-
scription practices directly; such authority rests with the states. The U.S. Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) has authority to restrict the post-approval 
marketing of new drugs designed for treating serious or life-threatening ill-
nesses and has indicated that these regulations can be used specifically in cases 
of new antimicrobial drugs. Restricted distribution is, however, a disincentive 
to the development of new drugs, and the regulations do not address misuse of 
existing products. 169 
On a careful read, however, Fidler asserts only that the federal government 
might not be able to "regulate ... prescription practices directly .... " The 
grounds for even this narrow restriction on national power, however, are 
statutory, not constitutional. Although it is true that traditionally and at pre-
sent the states have controlled most issues surrounding regulation of medi-
cal prescriptions, the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence 
suggests that Congress has the power to take over this arena. 170 
Fidler seems to have meant that under existing federal law-in the 
main, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA")171-the Food and Drug 
Administration ("FDA", created under the Act) has no authority to regulate 
prescriptions in general. 172 The FDCA regulates safety, but not prescribing 
power. Thus, as long as it is legal under state law, physicians can write pre-
scriptions "off-label"-for uses not covered under the "label" information 
approved by the FDA. 
169 Fidler, supra note 117. 
170 The seminal modern cases defining the federal government's broad powers under the Commerce 
Clause are United States. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding power of Congress to regulate hours 
and wages, even for employees of businesses with only an indirect impact on interstate commerce), and 
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. Ill (1942) (upholding application of national wheat marketing quota to 
farmer who consumed or sold locally his crop). Recent Supreme Court cases setting limits on the 
Commerce Clause have barred national regulation in areas that are not commercial in any ordinary sense 
of the word. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating federal statute making 
gender-motivated violence a federal crime); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating 
federal statute forbidding carrying firearms near schools). Antibiotic use nationwide is a classic exam-
ple of interstate commerce, so Congress is almost surely unconstrained in its power to regulate the mar-
ket for antibiotics. 
171 21 U.S.C. §§ 30Hi95 (2000). 
172 Markow, supra note 101, at 541-43. 
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Other existing statutes might provide the basis for regulating the use of 
antibiotics. The Federal Controlled Substances Act ("FCSA"), 173 though 
designed to regulate addictive substances, does give the Attorney General 
the power to regulate any substmce that poses a "risk to public health."174 
At present, unsurprisingly, no antibiotics appear on the list of controlled 
substances, but the "risk to public health" standard sounds broad enough to 
regulate antibiotics; profligate use today can cause deaths in future years, 
the ultimate risk to public health. 
Finally, if Congress decided to regulate via taxation (e.g., a Pigovian 
tax), its power is almost plenary. In McCray v. United States, the Court up-
held a very high federal tax on colored margarine even accepting that the 
sole purpose of the tax was to give the butter industry a decisive competi-
tive advantage. "Since ... the taxing power conferred by the Constitution 
knows no limits except those expressly stated in that instrument, it must fol-
low, if a tax be within the lawful power, the exertion of that power may not 
be judicially restrained because of the results to arise from its exercise.'ms 
If an anti-competitive tax favoring one industry over another does not vio-
late the taxing power, it seems almost certain that Congress has the power 
to impose an efficient tax designed to solve a collective action problem-
such as a Pigovian tax on antibiotics. 
B. International Dimensions 
As Fidler has observed, the problem is international: "An important 
feature of the latest chapter in mankind's struggle with infectious diseases is 
that the threat ... is global in scope."176 The United States cannot go it 
alone. To avoid squandering antibiotics requires all nations (each on its 
own, or in unison) to adopt policies that will induce or coerce consumers to 
refrain from excessive use. If any nation, especially one of significant size, 
continues to use antibiotics indiscriminately, resistant strains will evolve 
there. As noted in the introduction to this section, the extent of interna-
tional travel and trade virtually guarantees that resistant strains will have 
numerous opportunities to travel around the globe and threaten everyone. 
The necessary cooperation does not seem like a significant problem for 
developed nations. With well-educated populations that democratically se-
lect leaders, and sophisticated bureaucracies to provide expertise, it should 
173 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (2000). 
174 Id. § 8ll(c)(6). Under the Act, the Attorney General places controlled substances on "sched-
ules," numbered one to five, with greater restrictions on use the lower the schedule number. 21 C.F.R. 
§ 1308.11 (class 1)-1308.15 (class V) (2004). 
175 195 U.S. 27, 59 (1904). For a more recent discussion of the virtually unlimited taxation powers 
of Congress, see United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 28 (1953) ("It is axiomatic that the power of 
Congress to tax is extensive and sometimes falls with crushing effect . . . . As is well known, the consti-
tutional restraints on taxing are few.") . 
176 David P. Fidler, Return of the Fourth Horseman: Emerging Infectious Diseases & International 
Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 771,774 (1997). 
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be theoretically possible (if one believes in democracy, anyway) for leaders 
to line up public support behind policies that will economize on antibiotic 
use and save lives down the road. An international accord to rationalize an-
tibiotic use need not specify a single means of compliance; one nation 
might choose a Pigovian tax specified in the agreement, another might pre-
fer long-term patents. All that matters is that each nation limits key antibi-
otic usage to relatively serious cases. 
Securing the cooperation of less developed nations, however, would 
likely be more difficult. 177 If so, antibiotic use in these nations poses a sig-
nificant threat to the effectiveness of the most valuable antibiotics. It will 
be harder to sell a less educated citizenry on the short-term pains necessary 
to achieve long-term gains in treating serious bacterial infections. And un-
popular regimes might hold out cheap, easily-obtainable antibiotics as a 
"goodie" compensating citizens in part for other policies its citizens find 
objectionable. 
Even a willing government in a poorer nation might not possess the bu-
reaucratic machinery to implement a solution. These countries may lack the 
police and judicial systems necessary to make patents effective. Similarly, 
such nations have only rudimentary tax collection systems, and effectively 
imposing a Pigovian tax might be beyond their capabilities. In addition, 
any significant tax will create a black market for which (again) there is in-
sufficient legal enforcement to control. These structural problems stand in 
the way of numerous beneficial policy reforms in the developing world, and 
they do not seem to be amenable to any easy solutions. 
There are some economic problems with limiting antibiotic use in de-
veloping countries that may be tractable, however. The lack of health in-
surance will make it more difficult to assure the non-wealthy that they will 
receive expensive treatments if and when they need them. Any attempt to 
charge high prices in poorer economies will inevitably raise cries of unfair-
ness, along with the concern that only the wealthy will ever receive treat-
ment. Any notion that pharmaceutical giants from developed nations are 
making profits from the working classes in poorer nations will only exacer-
bate the perceived inequity. 
There are a couple of ways to address this perception of unfairness. 
First, note that the price necessary to squelch inefficient low-value uses of 
antibiotics will be much lower in poor countries. Thus, permitting or even 
encouraging and assisting price discrimination, with significantly lower 
prices charged in developing nations, would serve notions of fairness. It of-
ten will be in the financial interest of a patent holder to engage in such price 
177 Although antibiotics are widely available over-the-counter in many third-world nations, it seems 
likely that those most widely available are older ones for which there is already significant resistance. 
See Investigating the Antibiotic Resistance Problem, at http://www.woodrow.org/teachers/bi/2000/An-
tibiotic_Resistance/introduction.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2004). 
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discrimination. 178 Wealthy countries also could address perceptions of in-
justice simply by donating (or selling at a deep discount) to poorer nations 
their estimated efficient level of antibiotics each year. The poor nations 
could then allocate the doses as they saw fit; for the purposes of the global 
battle to preserve the effectiveness of antibiotics, all that matters is that 
somehow governments limit the number of doses administered. 
Summing over a number of antibiotics and a number of larger poor na-
tions (e.g., India, Pakistan, Indonesia), the wealthy countries' pharmacy bill 
for gifting (or discounting) all this medicine likely would be significant. Is 
it worth it? One key point in answering this question is that such subsidies 
may be the best way, and perhaps the only way, to obtain the cooperation of 
poorer nations in the effort to control bacterial resistance and perhaps avoid 
a plague. If so, then the entire enterprise depends on this piece of the puz-
zle. 
Subsidies to such participants are rational when, as with antibiotic re-
sistance, a single weak component can undermine the entire scheme. This 
situation is called a "weakest link" technology; if a single program to limit 
antibiotic use fails, the efforts of all other nations are futile. 179 In other 
situations, e.g., sending a man to the moon as soon as possible, it makes 
sense to go to the other extreme and concentrate all resources on a single 
program. This is called "best shot" technology. For situations involving 
weakest link technology, it can be rational for wealthier participants to sub-
sidize the efforts of their poorer sisters. The wealthy might prefer a world 
where every nation pays its fair share, but that may be impossible or 
unlikely. Then the wealthier nations face a choice: subsidize and succeed, 
or don't subsidize and fail. As long as the subsidy is smaller than the gains 
from success, subsidy is preferable. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Paying significant subsidies (in one form or another) to assist distant 
nations may be a difficult sell for politicians in the United States and other 
developed nations. Yet assistance that helps poorer nations rationalize their 
use of antibiotics provides tangible domestic benefits: protection of the do-
nating nations (as well as the donee nations) from the specter of untreatable 
bacterial infections. Failure to control antibiotic use in poorer countries 
178 See supra text accompanying notes 122-127. For an extended defense of price discrimination in 
the international sale of patented drugs, see Patricia M. Danzon & Adrian Towse, Differential Pricing 
for Pharmaceuticals: Reconciling Access, R&D, and Patents, 3 INT'L J. HEALTH CARE FIN. & ECON. 
183 (2003). 
179 The pioneering study of "weakest-link" and related public goods "technologies" is Jack 
Hirschleifer, From Weakest-Link to Best-Shot: The Voluntary Provision of Public Goods, 41 PUB. 
CHOICE 3 71 (1983). The discussion in this paragraph also draws on Richard Comes, Dyke Maintenance 
& Other Stories: Neglected Types of Public Goods, I 08 Q.J. ECON. 259 { 1993), and RICHARD CORNES 
& TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, & CLUB GOODS 54-55, 184-89 
(2d ed. 1996). 
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will render futile all domestic policy measures adopted toward the same 
ends. 
As for the optimal domestic policy measures, this Article argues that 
patents of extraordinary duration are an attractive option for creating prop-
erty rights that solve the negative externality at the root of antibiotic over-
use. In return for higher prices early in the life of the antibiotic (the 
"premium"), society benefits from the monopoly patent holder's incentive 
to stretch out the useful life of the drug ("insurance coverage"). Assuming 
that society is risk-averse with respect to the possibility of depleting its ar-
senal of effective antibiotics, this trade-off is attractive. Note that making 
the patent term extremely long creates less social loss for antibiotics than 
for most inventions, since bacterial evolution of resistance effectively limits 
the useful life of such drugs. Finally, long-term patents give private parties 
a planning horizon that may induce them to keep new antibiotics in reserve, 
in anticipation of the possibility of a bacterial plague. 
In conjunction with long-term patents, the government should 
(i) subsidize the cost of tests that determine the germ causing an infection 
and its drug resistances; (ii) continue to subsidize vaccinations, and provide 
additional subsidies for research to develop vaccines for serious bacterial 
infections; and (iii) invest more in gathering information about infections 
caused by resistant bacterial strains. 
Without these or other measures (e.g., a Pigovian tax) to curb overuse, 
society runs the real risk of a future in which some serious bacterial infec-
tions will be untreatable. Worse, if such infections spread easily, mankind 
could suffer a disastrous plague. The problem poses a fundamental test of 
democracy and leadership in wealthier nations. The root problem is one of 
collective action: what is individually rational, to use antibiotics whenever 
they might help even a little, is socially irrational. Governments exist in 
large part to solve such problems. Arguments against taking action to curb 
overuse of antibiotics reflect myopia ("I prefer cheap antibiotics (and meat) 
today, even if it puts my children at risk of death from a resistant bacteria in 
20 years") or false economy ("Why should we subsidize citizens in poorer 
nations?"). Failure to act will reflect either deficient leaders unable to dis-
abuse citizens of these misguided notions, or a dissolute populace unwilling 
or unable to make modest sacrifices now to limit grave future risks. 
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APPENDIX 
Deriving Results Comparing Immediate Sale of a Novel Antibiotic 
with Shelving It in Anticipation of the Next Plague 
(discussed supra text accompanying footnotes 13 8-13 9 ) 
First, define the following terms: 
r = real rate of interest 
1 
o=--
l+r 
p = odds of plague in a given year 
H = (high) price of drug during a plague (assume H = I without loss 
of generality) 
L =(low) price of drug during normal times 
Vw = Expected value of waiting to market until first plague 
Vm =Expected value from marketing immediately 
The usual manipulation of potentially infinite-term discounting equa-
tion tell us that V w is given by: 
Vw= p[(l- p)t52] 
1- (1- p)t5 
Under the assumption that r = 3%, p = 0.5%, and L = H/250, Vw com-
putes to .14 (i.e., 14% of the value of being able to sell the drug immedi-
ately in a plague (high-demand) market). 
Computing Vm is a bit more involved. The following explanation dem-
onstrates how to compute the expected value for a given year, and then pre-
sents computation results for a twenty-year period by summing up such 
terms. 
Given our assumption that an antibiotic can be used against only one 
plague, for each year we must calculate the odds that a plague occurs first in 
that year; this is given for year t by 
The expected payoff in such a year (low demand in all preceding years, 
then high plague demand in that year) is the sum of a discounted series of 
t-1 payments of L followed by a discounted payment of H: 
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8-8~ (L+8rH) 
1-8 
The expected payoff is then simply the sum of the product of these two 
terms over the number of years-in our case; the length of the patent pe-
riod, which is roughly twenty years. There is a final term, beyond the sum, 
to reflect the possibility that no plague occurs within the twenty-year pe-
riod; the expected value in that case simply includes the discounted value of 
a stream of twenty payoffs in low-demand (non-plague) markets. Algebrai-
cally, we have: 
The following table shows the calculation of this sum for the parame-
ters used above r == 3%, p == .005, H == 1, L == 11250). 
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Odds that Discounted 
first value if 1st Product of 
plague plague oc- odds and 
occurs m curs in this discounted 
Year this year year value Comment 
1 0.50% 0.97 0.0049 plague in 1st period 
2 0.50% 0.95 0.0047 plague not in 1st, but in 2nd 
3 0.50% 0.92 0.0046 plague not in 1st or 2nd, but 
in 3rd 
4 0.49% 0.90 0.0044 
5 0.49% 0.88 0.0043 
6 0.49% 0.86 0.0042 
7 0.49% 0.83 0.0041 
8 0.48% 0.81 0.0039 
9 0.48% 0.79 0.0038 
10 0.48% 0.78 0.0037 
11 0.48% 0.76 0.0036 
12 0.47% 0.74 0.0035 
13 0.47% 0.72 0.0034 
14 0.47% 0.70 0.0033 
15 0.47% 0.69 0.0032 
16 0.46% 0.67 0.0031 
17 0.46% 0.66 0.0030 
18 0.46% 0.64 0.0029 
19 0.46% 0.63 0.0029 
20 0.45% 0.61 0.0028 plague not in 1-19, but in 
20th 
90.46% 0.60 0.0538 no plague during 20 years 
0.1281 TOTAL EXPECTED 
VALUE 
The total expected value, about .129, is roughly seven percent less than 
the expected value of simply waiting for the first plague before marketing, 
no matter how long that might take. Thus, in a world without a time limit 
on patent monopolies, it would be privately rational for a patent owner to 
wait; this squares with the socially optimal result. Time-limited patents 
shorten the horizons of the patent holder and may make it privately rational 
(though socially undesirable) to market the antibiotic immediately. 
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